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INTRODUCTION
On January 3, 2005, atheist Michael Newdow filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California asking that the court
enforce the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment' by ordering Congress
to remove the words "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance.4 Various
plaintiffs joined Newdow in an effort to cure standing problems that had induced
the Supreme Court to deny his claim in an earlier action.5
The advance announcement of Newdow's lawsuit was one more event in a
contentious 2004-2005 holiday season marked by charges that secularists were
trying to push Christmas out of public life and by countercharges that Christians
were trying to push God down dissenters' throats.6 Within three months, the
(1994) [hereinafter LEvY];
Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
(Leonard W. Levy ed., 1987) [hereinafter Levy, Bill of Rights];
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill Jensen
et al. eds., 1976) (multiple vols. projected; not all completed) [hereinafter DocuMENTARY
HISTORY];
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Understanding of the Free Exercise ofReligion,
103 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell];
FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM (1985) [hereinafter MCDONALD];
Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, 39 IDAHO L. REv. 489
(2003) [hereinafter Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity];
Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in
Original Understanding, 52 U. KANS. L. REv. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Natelson, General
Welfare];
Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 243 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Necessary and Proper];
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1077
(2004) [hereinafter Natelson, Public Trust];
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 2004) [herein-
after NOWAK & ROTUNDA];
STEPHEN D. SMrrH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995) [hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE];
THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EvOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughn eds., 1988) [hereinafter
VIRGINIA STATUTE].
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ... ").
" See Original Complaint at 33, Newdow v. United States Cong., No. 2:05-CV-00017-
LKK-DAD (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3,2005), available at http://www.restorethepledge.com/litigation/
pledge/docs/2005-01-03 %200riginal%20Complaint.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
' Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004), reb 'g denied, 125
S. Ct. 21 (2004).
6 See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Christmas in the Public Square, http://www.professor
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Supreme Court was hearing oral arguments over the question of whether copies of
the Ten Commandments should be removed from state buildings in Kentucky 7 and
Texas,' a point on which the Court's justices found themselves severely divided.'
Controversy can be stoked by the absence of clear rules, I" and one thing
everyone agrees on is that much of the controversy over the Establishment Clause
arises because the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Clause has not been clear.1"
Professor A.E. Dick Howard has called the Court's course of decision a "serpentine
wall."' 2 There are, for example, at least three separate approaches to Establishment
Clause adjudication in active use on the Court - "strict separation," "neutrality,"
and "accommodation" - and any or all of these approaches can appear in the same
case.13
Quite properly, those seeking the meaning of the Establishment Clause have
looked to history for answers.' 4 Yet several have pronounced the historical record
bainbridge.com/2004/12/christmas-in-th.html (Dec. 17, 2004) (last visited Aug. 24, 2005)
("It is Christmastime, and what would Christmas be without the usual platoon of annoying
pettifoggers rising annually to strip Christmas of any Christian content?") (quoting Charles
Krauthammer, Just Leave Christmas Alone, WASH. POST., Dec. 17, 2004, at A33). The
2005-2006 holiday season proved contentious as well, and for similar reasons. See, e.g.,
Falwellfightingfor holy holiday: He'll sue, boycott groups he sees as muzzling Christmas,
SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 20, 2005, at Al.
' ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), reh 'g denied, 361
F.3d 938 (6th Cir.), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
8 Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
' This is evidenced by the Supreme Court split in McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union of Kentucky, and Van Orden v. Perry. In Van Orden v. Perry, the Court
upheld a display on the state capitol grounds in Texas, while the Court in McCreary County
struck down the display of the Commandments on the walls of the two courthouses. In both
cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas voted to
uphold the displays, while Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsberg voted against the
displays. Justice Breyer supplied the swing vote, upholding the Texas display, while dis-
allowing the Kentucky display.
'o See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 578
(1988) (repeating the [not invariably true] observation that "[W]e establish a system of clear
entitlements so that we can barter and trade for what we want instead of fighting.").
" See SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 2, at 3-5 (describing commentators'
dismay at the course of adjudication on the subject); see also JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
1-6 (1995) (detailing the difficulties with history in the Religion Clauses).
12 A. E. Dick Howard, The Supreme Court and the Serpentine Wall, in VIRGINIA
STATUTE, supra note 2, at 313.
13 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 977-84 (summarizing the views and illustrating
them with three different opinions in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)).
Based on the Establishment Clause's "original meaning" as threshed out by the findings of
this Article, none of these approaches is correct!
"4 The tendency of all sides to do so, in this more than in some other constitutional areas,
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hopelessly confused. 5 For example, the debate over the Bill of Rights in the First
Congress appears, when not read in context, inconclusive. 6 The records of state
ratification of the Bill of Rights are scanty. Therefore, both commentators" and
the Supreme Court' 9 have turned to the church-state philosophies of Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison. The premise here is that the philosophies of these
is noted in Robert P. George, Protecting Religious Liberty in the Next Millennium: Should
We Amend the Religion Clauses of the Constitution?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 27, 28 (1998);
see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 969-71; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, at
1411.
"5 E.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, at 1411.
16 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 95 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The entire
debate on the Religion Clauses is contained in two full columns of the 'Annals,' and does not
seem particularly illuminating.").
'7 The records are summarized in ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 143-58.
S See, e.g., Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., The Political Theology of Thomas Jefferson, in
VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 2, at 75; Lance Banning, James Madison, the Statute for
Religious Freedom, and the Crisis of Republican Convictions, in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra
note 2, at 109; KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 2, at 88-130 (discussing Jefferson's views
at length); Steven H. Shiffbin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 9, 43, 61 (2004) (discussing Madison's and Jefferson's personal notions
of the relationship between religion and state). Historian Leonard W. Levy discusses
Madison's views at length - and then admits, correctly, that the First Amendment does not
embody Madison's personal views. LEVY, supra note 2, at 119-33. Cf infra notes 67, 73-75,
289 and accompanying text.
'9 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by
those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption
was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one
religion over another or to support religion in general. James Madison,
who is generally recognized as the leading architect of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment, observed in his famous Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments that "the same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property
for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to
any other establishment in all cases whatsoever." The concern of
Madison and his supporters was quite clearly that religious liberty
ultimately would be the victim if government could employ its taxing
and spending powers to aid one religion over another or to aid religion
in general.
Id. at 103-04 (internal citation omitted). See also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 503 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles in the events
leading to the adoption of the First Amendment."); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
11-13 (1947), reh 'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
162-64 (1876) (discussing Jefferson, Madison, the Virginia disestablishment battle, and
quoting the "wall of separation" language).
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two men are key to interpreting the religion clauses, particularly because of their
role in the Virginia disestablishment battle.20 But the premise is wildly inaccurate.2
There were hundreds of actors from all over the country involved in the crafting and
adoption of the First Amendment. It is safe to say that most did not draw their
inspiration from either the personal opinions of Jefferson and Madison, nor from
a Virginia disestablishment fight most probably had never heard of.
Indeed, Jefferson's immediate role in the adoption of the First Amendment was
rather insignificant. He had served as minister to France since 1785 and did not
return to America until November 23, 1789, after the Bill of Rights had been
approved by Congress and sent to the states for ratification.22 Even if he had played
a more active part, Jefferson's freethinking outlook on religion (whether classified
as deist or Unitarian)23 was hardly representative of those who debated and ratified
that Amendment. Madison, more mainstream than Jefferson and therefore more
sympathetic to religion,24 was a far more central figure for our purposes. He
introduced the first draft of the Bill of Rights in Congress and shepherded it to
approval there. Yet Madison plainly implied on the floor of Congress that the
Establishment Clause embodied views other than his own.25
20 See, e.g., Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughn, Editor's Preface to VIRGINIA
STATUTE, supra note 2, at vii-xi.
21 See James J. Knicely, "First Principles" and the Misplacement of the "Wall of
Separation ": Too Late in the Day for a Cure?, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 171 (2004).
Everson's solemn invocation of Jefferson and Madison, and its
commanding pronouncements from the Virginia disestablishment battle
- portrayed as the view subscribed to by most early Americans -
established a powerful doctrinal engine for a completely new regime of
law in all of the states. The slow but progressive revelation of its
incomplete and distorted rendition of that history has produced,
however, not only a doctrine in need ofjustification, but a body of law
with underpinnings that cannot long withstand the absence of a
legitimate rationale for decision.
Id. at 205 (internal citations omitted).
2 See B.L. RAYNER, LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213,265 (1834). Justice Rehnquist also
made this point in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
23 Jefferson "denied the divinity of Christ and the authority of scripture" and expressed
strong support for Unitarianism. McConnell, supra note 2, at 1449-50. But see Thomas E.
Buckley, S.J., The Political Theology of Thomas Jefferson, in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note
2, at 77 (claiming that Jefferson's ideas were not so far out of the mainstream).
24 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1453.
25 See infra notes 67, 73-75, 287-289 and accompanying text. The problems with relying
on the opinions of Madison and Jefferson are pointed out by a writer whose predictability on
such a point does not alter the fact that his analysis is accurate. See M.G. "Pat" Robertson,
Squeezing Religion Out of the Public Square - The Supreme Court, Lemon, and the Myth
of the Secular Society, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 223, 261-62 (1995).
[Vol. 14:73
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All this has sent commentators looking for clues to meaning from developments
occurring after - often long after - the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were
ratified.26 After-the-fact evidence is usually fairly weak, however, and the later the
evidence, the less its probative value.27
Getting the right answer - if it exists - requires that you look in the right
place.28 For all these reasons, I submit that courts and commentators have not, by
and large, been looking in the right place.
Let's start with a very basic question: Why was the First Amendment adopted?
Answer: Because political realities demanded it. The crucial political reality of the
time was that to secure ratification of the Constitution, the document's proponents,
the federalists, had to make a deal, a Gentlemen's Agreement. 29 They cut the deal
with moderate antifederalists and fence-sitters in order to get the votes they needed
at state ratifying conventions. Without this political bargain, the Constitution
probably would not have been adopted. Under the terms of the bargain, the
federalists committed themselves to addressing, after ratification, certain concerns
expressed by antifederalists, several of which involved religion. Specifically, the
federalists had to acquiesce to a constitutional amendment to ensure that the federal
government would neither "establish" religion nor interfere with free exercise.
The historical record pertaining to the Gentlemen's Agreement is copious. It
is comprised of newspaper articles, pamphlets, personal letters, and complete or
partial transcripts of most of the state ratifying conventions. These materials docu-
ment the roles of hundreds of actors (not just Jefferson and Madison) and rather
clearly illuminate the final bargain. It should be obvious to legal commentators that
26 For example, most of the content in CORD, supra note 2, involves nineteenth-century
history decades after ratification. Id. at 59-239. See also Leo Pfeffer, Madison's "Detached
Memoranda": Then and Now, in VIRGINIA STATUTE, supra note 2, at 283-312 (discussing
material written by Madison on church-state relations in old age, at least twenty-eight years
after the First Amendment was drafted); Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding
of the Establishment Clause, 6 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 399 (2002).
27 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitutions'
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEo. L.J. 1113, 1167 (2003) ("Precedents that are removed from
the Founding era are less likely to reflect original meaning, especially given intervening
events, and some precedents are so far removed as to not reflect original meaning at all, and
are therefore inadmissible."). Kesavan and Paulsen argue that precedents up to fifty years
after the founding ought to be received. Id. at 1168. I'm a little more skeptical.
28 Cf. Kurland, supra note 2, at 839 ("The right answer depends on the right question;...
if I could not find the right answer through my research, I was not supposed to make it up.").
29 This term for the bargain has been used before, as by the former Chief Justice of the
United States. See Warren E. Burger, Address Before the Fifth Annual Judicial Conference
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 119 F.R.D. 45, 80 (1987); see
also Rachael E. Schwartz, "Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines ": An Alternative
Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599, 628 (1996) (using
the term and following an earlier source in doing so).
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if the meaning of a writing (here, the Establishment Clause) is uncertain, one way
to resolve the uncertainty may be to examine the transactions that produced the
writing.3" Yet in the case of the Gentlemen's Agreement leading to the Establish-
ment Clause, commentators have tended not to do so.
31
One reason may be that some writers are afraid of what they might find there.32
Or perhaps the allure of the ever-popular Jefferson and Madison has been too
strong. 3 An explanation I long thought was sufficient was that most investigators
have not had full access to the ratification record until recently. Today, however,
even those of us living out in the boonies (I write from Montana) have access to the
30 E.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.10, at 492 (1982) ("The overarching
principle of contract interpretation is that the court is free to look to all the relevant
circumstances surrounding the transaction. This includes... any prior negotiations between
them.").
3' Among the many Establishment Clause commentators- on all sides ofthe debate over
the meaning of the Clause - who omit serious discussion of the 1787-1788 ratification
debates are: CORD, supra note 2; DREISBACH, supra note 2; HOWE, supra note 2; KRAMNICK
& MOORE, supra note 2; LEVY, supra note 2; SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note
2; JOHN WrITE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 63-64
(2000) (devoting less than a page and a half to the ratification struggle); Veronica C. Abreu,
Muddled Original Understandings of the Establishment Clause: A Comparative Critique of
Philip Hamburger's and Noah Feldman's Historical Arguments, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
615 (2005); Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The
Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1
(2005); Douglas Laycock, "Non-Preferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 875 (1986); Gregory C. Sisk, Stating the
Obvious: Protecting Religionfor Religion 's Sake, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 45 (1998); Rodney K.
Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569
(1984); Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular ": Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision, 67 TEX. L. REv. 955 (1989); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, at
1411-12 (mentioning several influences on the religion clauses, but not the Constitution's
ratification history). Some authors have discussed the ratification debates in an abbreviated
way. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 2; Lash, supra note 2, at 1089-91 (whose article really
is concerned with later history); Henry T. Miller, Comment, Constitutional Fiction: An
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpretation Of the Religion Clauses, 47 LA. L. REv. 169
(1986). In his examination of the Free Exercise Clause, Professor (now Judge) Michael
McConnell largely omitted ratification history on the ground that existing "state constitutions
provide the most direct evidence of the original understanding" of the Free Exercise Clause.
McConnell, supra note 2, at 1456. The problem with this assertion, of course, is that the
existing state constitutions had been adopted years before and often by other people. Two
recent works devote more satisfactory attention to the ratification battle. They are Feldman,
supra note 2, and HAMBURGER, supra note 2, discussed infra at various points.
32 Kurland, supra note 2, at 840 ("I dare say that most of the so-called literature in the
field of first amendment law - my own included - reflects the advocate with a cause rather
than disinterested scholarship.").
" There are, of course, innumerable treatments of both men.
[Vol. 14:73
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Internet and its valuable constitutional history web sites.34 Additionally, we are
now blessed with the continuing, although not yet complete, publication of
the University of Wisconsin's Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution.35 On the other hand, Professor Chester Antieau and his coauthors
were able to resort extensively to the constitutional ratification record, and they
wrote over forty years ago.36
Whatever the reason for the underutilization of ratification material, it appears
things may be changing. The last three years have witnessed publication of two
impressive Establishment Clause studies making better use of that material.
Professor Noah Feldman3 employs some of it, along with earlier records, to explain
the founding generation's free exercise ideology and the emergence of the
Establishment Clause from that ideology. Professor Philip Hamburger38 exploits
ratification material to dispute the "Wall of Separation" interpretation of the
Establishment Clause. This Article builds on both the Feldman and Hamburger
studies.
In these pages, I demonstrate how the "religion terms" of the Gentlemen's
Agreement clarify the meaning of the Establishment Clause so that persistent
interpretive difficulties largely disappear. There is one caveat, however: My
deductions of original meaning do not necessarily reflect my personal views of what
constitutional rules should be.39
I. THE FOUNDERS' GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT: WHAT IT WAS AND WHAT IT DID
A. Formation of the Agreement During the Ratification Debates
The federal constitutional convention met in Philadelphia from May until
September, 1787. Upon adjourning, the convention sent its proposed Constitution
to Congress for transmittal to state legislatures and, ultimately, to popularly-elected
state ratifying conventions."
" Sites maintained by the Constitution Society, http://www.constitution.org, The Avalon
Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm, and the American
Memory site of the Library of Congress, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lawhome.
html, have proven particularly useful.
" DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2.
36 ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 100-07, 111-22.
17 Feldman, supra note 2.
38 See HAMBURGER, supra note 2.
" For example, I believe that atheists and agnostics should enjoy full civil rights. This,
apparently, was not the opinion of many of those who crafted the Gentlemen's Agreement.
See, e.g., infra Part II.D.
40 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xl-xli.
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In an early propaganda victory, proponents of the Constitution convinced the
public to label them "federalists" and their adversaries "antifederalists."' By early
January 1788, federalists had convinced conventions in five states - Delaware,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut - to ratify by substantial
margins.42 Thereafter, the opposition stiffened. Antifederalists interposed many
objections, of which most derived ultimately from the belief that the Constitution
would give far too much power to the central government. Antifederalists predicted
that the central government would abuse that power and effectively obliterate the
states and oppress the people. They argued against approval of the Constitution
until after a new national convention met and adopted substantial changes.
Federalists recognized that such a course involved great practical difficulties for the
Constitution.43 Faced with the unpleasant alternatives of quick defeat or protracted
defeat, they made a pact with political moderates - the fence-straddlers and tepid
antifederalists.
Under the terms of this pact, the federalists made important concessions, and
in exchange, the moderates agreed to support the Constitution. These concessions
were of three principal kinds.
First, the federalists offered authoritative and reassuring interpretations of
worrisome parts of the document. For example, the antifederalists were contending
that the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clauses4 might invalidate civil legislation, such
as that necessary to restructure the public debt. Federalists represented that the Ex
Post Facto clauses would apply only to criminal laws.4 1 Similarly, antifederalists
"1 Naturally, antifederalists were piqued at this labeling. See, e.g., ANNALS, supra note
2, at 759 (quoting Rep. Elbridge Gerry, a former antifederalist, who complained of this
labeling and stated that "[t]heir names then ought not to have been distinguished by
federalists and antifederalists, but rats and antirats.").
42 See 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xli (providing the chronology and
votes).
43 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 618 (recording Madison's comments
at the Virginia ratifying convention).
Suppose eight states only should ratify, and Virginia should propose
certain alterations, as the previous condition of her accession. If they
[i.e., other states] should be disposed to accede to her proposition,
which is the most favorable conclusion, the difficulty attending it will
be immense. Every state which has decided it, must take up the subject
again. They must not only have the mortification ofacknowledging that
they had done wrong, but the difficulty of having a reconsideration of
it among the people, and appointing new conventions to deliberate
upon it.
Id.
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No ex post facto Law shall be passed."); id. § 10,
cl. 1 ("No State shall pass any ex post facto Law....").
41 See Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity, supra note 2, at 493-94.
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argued that the General Welfare Clause' might be construed as an independent and
indefinite grant of national power. Federalists represented - and this seems quaint
today47 - that the General Welfare Clause was a limitation rather than a grant of
power.48
Second, the federalists reassured moderates that the states would retain wide
jurisdiction exclusive of the central government. Antifederalists had been arguing
that the Constitution would sweep all but the most trivial concerns into the national
sphere. Federalist speakers and authors, therefore, issued lists enumerating specific
functions that would remain the exclusive province of state governments. These
functions included, inter alia, the regulation of real estate within state boundaries,
governance of agriculture and manufacturing, adjudication of matters between
citizens of the same state, and care of the poor.49
Third, insofar as the foregoing representations were deemed insufficient, the
parties agreed that the Constitution, once ratified, would be amended. At ratifying
conventions in Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New
York, moderates voted for ratification, and federalists voted to recommend
amendments. After ratification, both sides were to work together to secure the
needed changes. Moreover, two states - North Carolina and Rhode Island -
actually postponed ratification until Congress had approved amendments.50
Without this political pact, the Constitution probably would not have come into
effect.5' Even with it, the convention majorities for ratification in Massachusetts,
Virginia, New Hampshire, and New York were quite narrow;52 and without it, North
Carolina and Rhode Island would not have ratified either.53
In adhering to this bargain, the moderates took a risk. They had no legally
enforceable guarantee that, once nine states had ratified and the new government
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States. .. ").
4' The General Welfare Clause or so-called "Spending Clause" is, of course, the
constitutional justification for much of the modem federal welfare state. See South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding conditions on grants to states for unenumerated
congressional purposes); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social
Security Act); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (expounding a broad interpretation
of the clause).
48 See generally Natelson, General Welfare, supra note 2.
41 See Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469, 481-88
(2003).
50 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at xlii.
s' See supra notes 43-50 and infra note 60 and accompanying text.
52 The Constitution was approved in Massachusetts by a vote of 187-168, in Virginia by
89-79, in New York by 30-27, and in New Hampshire by 57-47. 13 DOcUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at xli-xlii.
" See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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had come into operation, the federalists would fulfill their promise. For that reason,
Chief Justice Warren Burger and others have characterized the pact as a "Gentlemen's
Agreement, ' 4 an agreement enforceable only by the honor of the participants."
Fortunately for the country, honor was no small security among statesmen of the
founding generation. Its value was expressed in Joseph Addison's Cato, the most
beloved drama of the age: 6
Honour's a sacred tie, the law of kings,
The noble mind's distinguishing perfection,
That aids and strengthens virtue where it meets her,
And imitates her actions, where she is not....
B. Execution of the Agreement in Congress
During the public debate over ratification, Madison had opposed a bill of rights.58
Once the new government was instituted, he found that in order to secure election to
Congress, he had to promise he would support one. 9 So on June 8, 1789, he took the
floor in the House of Representatives to announce that, despite his earlier opposition
to amendments, he was now "bound in honor and in duty" to advocate some. As he
proceeded to do so, he found that his most uncompromising opponents were federal-
ists who had no such debt of honor, for they hailed from states like Delaware6 and
Georgia,62 where adoption of the Constitution had been early, unanimous, and had
not required any gentleman to pledge his word. Madison also ran into more qualified
foot-dragging from Congressmen representing Connecticut63 and Maryland, 64 where
14 See supra note 29.
55 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 486 (10th ed. 1999) (defining
"gentlemen's agreement" as "an agreement secured only by the honor of the participants").
56 See Forrest McDonald, Forewordto ADDISON, CATosupranote 2, at viii-x (describing
the contemporaneous role of honor and the influence of Addison's Cato); see also Joseph
Addison, Guardian, No. 161, in ADDISON, CATO, supra note 2, at 194-97; MCDONALD,
supra note 2, at 196-99.
57 ADDISON, CATO, supra note 2, at 50.
58 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 330 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying
convention). This opposition was noted by Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S.
38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" The story is told in McConnell, supra note 2, at 1476-79.
60 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 441. See also Levy, Bill of Rights, supra note 2, at 284
(stating that Madison "felt honor-bound to redeem a campaign pledge to his constituents,
mindful that the Constitution 'would have been certainly rejected' by Virginia without
assurances from its supporters to seek subsequent amendments") (emphasis in original).
61 Id. at 446-48, 466-67 (Rep. John Vining).
62 Id. at 441-42, 459-62 (Rep. James Jackson).
63 See id at 444--45 (Rep. Roger Sherman).
64 See id at 441 (Rep. William Smith). The vote for ratification in Maryland was
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opposition had not been strong enough to force the federalists to pledge their honor
in exchange for victory.
Other authors have provided blow-by-blow descriptions of the congressional
debate over the bill of rights.6" There is no need to do so here. Suffice to say that
a fair reading of the congressional proceedings supports the following conclusions.
First, Madison proposed some amendments because he personally thought they
would improve the Constitution and others because they were demanded by the
Gentlemen's Agreement.6 6 However, as contemporaneous sources attest, 67 only a
few of his proposals fell into the first category. These included:
* his favorite (but ultimately unratified) recommendation to limit state
infringements on individual liberties, 68 an item for which there had been no
public demand;
lopsided: 63-11. See 13 DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 2, at xli.
65 See, e.g., ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 123-42; LEVY, supra note 2, at 88-105.
66 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 450 ("I will not propose a single alteration which I do not
wish to see take place, as intrinsically proper in itself, or proper because it is wished for by
a respectable number of my fellow-citizens .... ."); see also id. at 459, 775.
67 Madison clearly found most of the amendment project distasteful and justified only by
the requirements of the Gentlemen's Agreement. Thus, on August 19, 1789, he privately
referred to the "nauseous project of amendments." Levy, Bill ofRights, supra note 2, at 258.
Only eight days earlier, Senator Pierce Butler had written to James Iredell as follows:
A few milk-and-water amendments have been proposed by Mr.
M[adison]., such as liberty of conscience, a free press, and one or two
general things already well secured. I suppose it was done to keep his
promise with his constituents, to move for alterations; but, if I am not
greatly mistaken, he is not hearty in the cause of amendments.
Letter from Pierce Butler to James Iredell (Aug. 11, 1789), in CREATINGTHEBILLOFRIGHTS,
supra note 2, at 274 (emphasis in original). See also Levy, Bill ofRights, supra note 2, at 284
(quoting Madison as acknowledging that without the promise that a bill of rights would be
added to the Constitution, the document "would have been 'certainly rejected' in Virginia")
(emphasis in original).
That Madison was representing views other than his own was recognized by Justice
Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaifrey, 472 U.S. 38 (1985):
Madison's subsequent remarks in urging the House to adopt his drafts
of the proposed amendments were less those of a dedicated advocate
of the wisdom of such measures than those of a prudent statesman
seeking the enactment of measures sought by a number of his fellow
citizens which could surely do no harm and might do a great deal of
good.
Id. at 93-94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also id. at 98 ("ilt was James Madison speaking
as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating the
Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States Constitution.").
68 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 458 ("I think there is more danger of those powers being
abused by the State Governments than by the Government of the United States... I should
therefore wish to extend this interdiction."); id. at 784 ("Mr. MADISON conceived this to be
the most valuable amendment in the whole list.").
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" an ultimately unratified amendment pertaining to congressional represen-
tation;69 and
• the proposal that became the Takings Clause.70 Madison introduced this,
in conjunction with the Due Process Clause,7' in an effort to plug a hole left
by the ratification-era understanding of the federal Ex Post Facto Clause.72
All or most of Madison's other amendments, including those on religion,
reflected his understanding of the demands of the terms of the Gentlemen's
Agreement. 7' This is shown by his care in distancing his personal views from those
proposals, even while defending them.74 When drafting amendments for the sake
of the public bargain, rather than for himself, Madison tried to change as little as the
bargain would allow.75
69 Id. at 457.
70 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation."). Madison's original proposal is reported in ANNALS, supra note 2, at
451-52 ("No person [shall be] obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary
for public use, without a just compensation.").
71 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law...."). Madison's original proposal was identical. ANNALS, supra
note 2, at 451-52.
72 See Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity, supra note 2, at 522-27 (2003).
73 Tench Coxe, a Philadelphia businessman, associate of Hamilton, and leading federalist
essayist, told Madison that the latter had succeeded in his purpose very well:
I observe you have brought forward the amendments you proposed to
the federal Constitution. I have given them a very careful perusal, and
have attended particularly to their reception by the public .... In short
the most ardent & irritable among our friends are well pleased with
them. On the part of the opposition, I do not observe any unfavorable
animadversion. Those who are honest are well pleased at the footing on
which the press, liberty of conscience, original right & power, trial by
jury &ca. are rested.... I feel very great satisfaction in being able to
assure you generally that the proposed amendments will greatly tend to
promote harmony among the late contending parties and a general
confidence in the patriotism of Congress.
Letter from Tench Coxe to James Madison (June 18, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 252.
7 See, e.g., ANNALS, supra note 2, at 449 (describing constituents' "jealousy" for their
liberty as "though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its motive"); id. at 757 (noting that
"as it was desired by a great number of the people of America, [Madison] would consent to
it, though he was not convinced it was absolutely necessary"); id. at 758 (regarding his draft
of the Establishment Clause, "Whether the words are necessary or not, [Madison] did not
mean to say, but they had been required by some of the State Conventions....").
7 See, e.g., id. at 450 ("[W]e must feel for the constitution itself, and make that revisal
a moderate one."); id. at 800 ("Mr. MADISON was willing to make every amendment that was
required by the States, which did not tend to destroy the principles and the efficacy of the
constitution. . .").
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Second, Madison repeatedly reminded his colleagues of his - and their"6 -
obligation to abide by the Gentlemen's Agreement. He recounted the circumstances
and expectations under which the Constitution had been ratified and the terms
necessary to make it fully acceptable. 77 "I appeal to the gentlemen who have heard
the voice of their country," he declaimed, "to those who have attended the debates
of the State conventions .... .""
Sometimes Madison lapsed into the explicit language of bargain:
The acquiescence which our fellow-citizens show under the
Government, calls upon us for a like return of moderation....
It is to provide those securities for liberty which are required by
a part of the community; I allude in a particular manner to those
two States that have not thought fit to throw themselves into the
bosom of the Confederacy.79
Third, other Congressmen backed Madison by reminding their comrades of the
exigencies of the Gentlemen's Agreement. They described the state of public
opinion8" and the resolutions of the ratifying conventions.8' Aedanus Burke of
South Carolina, for example, said "[T]he people knew, and were sensible, that in
ratifying the present constitution, they parted with their liberties; but it was under
a hope that they would get them back again."82 As time went on, even anti-
amendment diehards like John Vining of Delaware began to enter into the spirit and
seek to satisfy public opinion.83 More contract terminology crept into the debate."
Fourth, as deliberation proceeded, Madison and other members of Congress
reminded the rest of the consequences of failing to approve changes desired by the
76 See, e.g., id. at 441 ("I considered myself bound in honor and in duty to do what I have
done .... ."). See also id. at 448 (imploring Congress to spend time on the matter in fulfill-
ment of the people's wishes).
7 See, e.g., id. at 444, 448-49, 450, 457, 458, 749; see also id. at 753 ("[T]hough as
several States had proposed the number of two hundred, he thought some substantial reason
should be offered to induce the House to reject it."); id. at 789 ("Mr. MADISON supposed the
people would be gratified with the amendment...
78 Id. at 775.
79 Id. at 449 (referring to North Carolina and Rhode Island). On the desirability of
satisfying those two states, see id. at 463 (Rep. Elbridge Gerry); see also supra note 50.
80 Id. at 445 (Rep. Alexander White); id. at 466 (Rep. Thomas Sumter).
81 Id. at 464 (Rep. Elbridge Gerry); id. at 466 (Rep. Thomas Sumter); id. at 757-58 (Rep.
Daniel Carroll); id. at 760 (Rep. Thomas Tudor Tucker); id. at 760 (Rep. Thomas Hartley);
id. at 805 (Rep. Thomas Sumter).
2 Id. at 777.
83 Id. at 760 ("Mr. VINING said, if the thing was harmless, and it would tend to gratify the
States that had proposed amendments, he should agree to it.").
84 E.g., id. at 788 (Rep. Thomas Tudor Tucker) (referring to "expectations" of the
citizenry).
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people. 5 Such consequences could include widespread dissatisfaction with, and
suspicion of, the new government. 6 The words of Congressman (and later Vice-
President) Elbridge Gerry must have stung: "[U]nless Congress shall candidly
consider the amendments which have been proposed in confidence by the State
conventions, federal faith will not be considered very different from the punica
fides of Carthage."87 In that classically-trained era, of course, everyone knew the
treacherous reputation of "Punic faith." Several other Congressmen warned that
the state legislatures might seize the initiative by forcing Congress to call a new
national convention under the alternative amendment procedures of Article V.88
The ensuing reforms might be more radical than anyone present desired.89
Fifth, as members of Congress debated and altered Madison's proposals, they
often referred to what they perceived to be the needs of the Gentlemen's Agreement.' °
In other words, they justified alterations, or opposed alterations, in Madison's draft
by arguing that the outcome they sought better met the terms of the public bargain.
H. THE RELIGION TERMS IN THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT: FREE EXERCISE
A. Introduction
The Establishment Clause arose out of what might be called the "religion
terms" of the Gentlemen's Agreement. By examining the other religion terms of
that Agreement, we can get a better sense of the meaning of the ban on establish-
ments. These terms included the guarantee of free exercise, the requirement that
officeholders take oaths, and the ban on religious tests.
B. Reliance of the Policy Against Establishment. on the Policy of Free Exercise
Professor Feldman has concluded that those who opposed establishment did so
because they saw establishment as a threat to free exercise - in other words, that
85 See, e.g., id. at 444 (Rep. Madison); id. at 786 (Rep. Thomas Tudor Tucker).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 462, 464.
88 U.S. CONST. art. V ("[O]n the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, [Congress] shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments.. ").
89 See, e.g., ANNALS, supra note 2, at 450 (Rep. James Madison); id. at 446 (Rep. John
Page); id. at 462 (Rep. Elbridge Gerry); id. at 466 (Rep. Thomas Sumter); and id. at 787
(Rep. Thomas Tudor Tucker).
9 See, e.g., id. at 748 (Rep. Fisher Ames) (giving his interpretation of public opinion);
id at 749 (Rep. James Madison) (disagreeing with Ames); id. at 768 (Rep. Elbridge Gerry)
(discussing state convention results as reflecting popular opinion); id. at 799 (Rep. William
L. Smith) (advocating an amendment Madison had not proposed as conforming to majority
sentiment as reflected in the ratifying conventions).
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the purpose of the "no establishment" policy was to protect free exercise.9 The
ratification record amply supports this conclusion. That record contains many
instances in which the policy against establishments is seen as flowing naturally
from the protection of free exercise.
For example, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, Delegate Samuel
Spencer said he "advocate[d] for... [the right] of worshipping [sic] God according
to the dictates of conscience in particular. He therefore thought that no one
particular religion should be established."92 At the New York ratifying convention,
antifederalist Thomas Tredwell criticized the Constitution, stating, "I could have
wished also that sufficient caution had been used to secure to us our religious
liberties, and to have prevented the general government from tyrannizing over our
consciences by a religious establishment . . . ."" Advocates of amendments in
Maryland urged "[t]hat there be no national religion established by law; but that all
persons be equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty."94  At
antifederalist insistence, the Virginia ratifying convention included among its
proposed amendments a statement "[t]hat religion . . . can be directed only by
reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore ... no particular
religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to
others."95
Professor Feldman's insight is significant for a couple ofreasons. First, it tends
to show that the celebrated tension96 between the Establishment Clause and the Free
91 Feldman, supra note 2, at 381, 382-84, 398-402, 424; see also ANTIEAU, supra note
2, at 30-3 1.
92 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 200 (emphasis added).
9' See, e.g., 2 ELLOrTT's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 399.
4 Id. at 553 (emphasis added). See also Amendments Proposed by William Paca in the
Maryland Convention, MD. J., Apr. 29, 1788, reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 240-41.
95 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 659 (emphasis added). For similar statements
basing disestablishmentarianism on free exercise, see id. at 645 (reporting Zachariah Johnson
as saying at the Virginia ratifying convention, "If tests were required, and if the Church of
England, or any other, were established, I might be excluded from any office under the
government, because my conscience might not permit me to take the test required.");
Manasseh Cutler, Sermon (Aug. 24, 1788), reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 342 ("By the Constitution now established in the United States, religious as well
as civil liberty is secured. Full toleration is granted for free inquiry, and the exercise of the
rights of conscience. No one kind of religion, or sect of religion, is established as the national
religion, nor made, by national laws, the test of truth."); William Penn II, INDEP. GAZETTEER,
Jan. 3, 1788, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1426, 1434-35
(Microform Supp.) (complaining of test laws and state-established creeds as inconsistent with
free government).
96 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1140-41; see also John E. Joiner, Note, A Page of
History or a Volume of Logic?: Reassessing the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U.L. REv. 507, 507 (1996) ("Engaged in an inherent (and
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Exercise Clause97 may be overblown. If the Establishment Clause exists to serve
the Free Exercise Clause, then in the event of conflict, the former must yield. More
importantly for our purposes, the scope of the Free Exercise Clause would tend to
define the scope of the Establishment Clause. In particular, if the Free Exercise
Clause permits a particular government activity, that fact tends to demonstrate that
the Establishment Clause also allows it.
C. Why A Free Exercise Clause Was Deemed Necessary
Antifederalists charged that the Constitution would give the federal government
enough power to interfere with free exercise of religion.98 Although one federalist
response was to grumble that the charge seemed inconsistent with antifederalist
complaints about the lack of a religious test,99 their chief defense was that Congress
necessary) conflict with the Establishment Clause is the Free Exercise Clause ....").
" The Free Exercise Clause reads, "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion] ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98 Henry Abbot stated at the North Carolina ratifying convention:
Some are afraid, Mr. Chairman, that, should the Constitution be
received, they would be deprived of the privilege of worshipping [sic]
God according to their consciences, which would be taking from them
a benefit they enjoy under the present constitution. They wish to know
if their religious and civil liberties be secured under this system, or
whether the general government may not make laws infringing their
religious liberties.
4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 191. See also A Baptist, FREEMAN'S J., Jan. 23, 1788,
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1557-58 (Microform Supp.).
What alarms me most than any thing in the proposed Constitution, is,
that we have no security for our religious tenets; our future rulers may,
if they please, order the Mahometan religion, or any other, to be
universal on this continent....
... [I]t appears to have been an old and deep-laid scheme to make the
Episcopal Church the only established and lawful one in the United
States; and oblige us to maintain it.
Id.
99 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 635-36 (reporting James Innes
speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention).
[Antifederalists] inform you that Turks, Jews, Infidels, Christians, and
all other sects, may be Presidents, and command the fleet and army,
there being no test to be required; and yet the tyrannical and
inquisitorial Congress will ask me, as a private citizen, what is my
opinion on religion, and punish me if it does not conform to theirs. I
cannot think the gentleman could be serious when he made these
repugnant and incompatible objections.
Id. See also AM. MERCURY, Jan. 21, 1788, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 312 (Microform Supp.) (suggesting that antifederalist claims were incompatible).
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would have no authority to regulate religion. 0 This latter defense has resurfaced
in modem times because advocates of "strict separation" sometimes rely on it.
Since, the argument goes, the federal government was to have no authority over
religion and the First Amendment restricted rather than expanded federal power, the
federal government cannot now have any authority to support or recognize
religion.'10
The problem with that defense - both for the founding generation and for our
own - was, and is, the natural construction of the Constitution itself. At the Virginia
ratifying convention, Governor Edmund Randolph let the feline slip from the sack: in
stating that "no power is given expressly to Congress over religion,"'0 2 he implicitly
admitted that Congress would enjoy implied powers on the subject. Those implied
powers were, of course, recognized by the Necessary and Proper Clause,0 3 a provision
100 E.g., 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 208 (quoting Richard D. Spaight, at the
North Carolina ratifying convention as stating, "No power is given to the general government
to interfere with it at all. Any act of Congress on this subject would be a usurpation."); id. at
300 (Rep. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney) (stating at the South Carolina ratifying convention
that Congress had "no power at all" to interfere in religion); id. at 194 (James Iredell raising
the same argument at the North Carolina ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 93 (Rep. James Madison) (reiterating the point at the Virginia ratifying
convention); id. at 330 (same); Tench Coxe, "A Freeman," PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 1788,
reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 508 ("Every regulation relating
to religion, or the property of religious bodies, must be made by the state governments, since
no powers affecting those points are contained in the constitution."); see also id. at 510;
Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder IV, CONN. COURANT, Dec. 10, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 398, 401 ("There is no declaration of any kind to
preserve the liberty of the press, &c. Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of
burial of the dead; it is enough that congress have no power to prohibit either.") (emphasis
in original).
'01 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 2, at 83, 93; see also id. at 115 ("The fundamental defect
of the nonpreferential interpretation is that it results in the unhistorical contention that the
First Amendment augmented a nonexistent congressional power to legislate in the field of
religion."). One critic of "strict separation" who adopts the same line is Daniel Dreisbach.
DREISBACH, supra note 2, at 60 (stating that "matters not explicitly entrusted to the federal
government were assumed to be reserved by the individual or by the states," thereby
overlooking the grant of implied powers to the federal government and inaccurately
paraphrasing the Tenth Amendment, which was drafted without the words "explicitly" or
"expressly"); see U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also ANNALS, supra note 2, at 454 (Rep.
Madison, discussing in the first Congress the purpose of the Bill of Rights as restricting the
power of government).
102 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 204 (Gov. Randolph, speaking at the Virginia
ratifying convention; he is reported as having left out the word "expressly" later in the
convention) (emphasis added); see also id. at 469 (stating that the Constitution does not allow
the government to "take away or impair the freedom of religion").
103 This was discussed in the satirical antifederalist letter written by James Bowdoin.
James Bowdoin to James de Caledonia, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted
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Randolph himself had helped draft.3" By virtue of the Supremacy Clause,"°5 laws
adopted pursuant to this implied authority would override state religious guarantees.
And, indeed, by any reasonable construction, the unamended Constitution would
give the federal government significant power over religion. Congress would have
plenary jurisdiction over the national capital, the antifederalists' hated "Ten Miles
Square,"' 6 and thus full power to suppress free exercise there.'0 7 Congress would
in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 240 (referring to "powers to make all laws
which we may think necessary andproper" and "omission of declarations in favor of liberty of
conscience.... ."); see also The Cumberland County Petition to the Pennsylvania Convention,
Dec. 5, 1788, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 310-11 (referring to danger in the
Necessary and Proper Clause to religious freedom and advocating a bill of rights, including
freedom of religion). Madison took note of this analysis when introducing and supporting the
Bill of Rights. See ANNALS, supra note 2, at 455-56, 758; McConnell, supra note 2, at 1478
(stating that the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with other powers was seen as a
way for the new government to influence religion).
'" See Natelson, Necessary andProper, supra note 2, at 267-73 (providing a history of
this provision).
' 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 392 (John Smilie, speaking at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
At present there is no security, even for the rights of conscience, and
under the sweeping force of the sixth Article [i.e., the Supremacy
Clause] every principle of a bill of rights, every stipulation for the most
sacred and invaluable privileges of man, are left at the mercy of
government.
Id. See also Philadelphiensis, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 253 (referring to danger in the Supremacy Clause
to religious freedom).
"' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
107 See, e.g., Letter from Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams (Jan. 5, 1788), in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 267 ("I wish the Legislature of the united [sic]
States to have Ten Miles Square - But let the People settled there, have a Bill of Rights. Let
them know that they are Freemen - Let them have the Liberty of Speech, of the Press, of
Religion . . . ."); cf 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 616 (describing proceedings at the
constitutional convention).
Mr. Madison & Mr. Pinkney then moved to insert in the list of powers
vested in Congress a power - "to establish an University, in which no
preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of religion."
Mr Wilson supported the motion
Mr Govr Morris. It is not necessary. The exclusive power at the Seat
of Government, will reach the object.
On the question
N. H. no - Mas. no. Cont. divd. Dr. Johnson ay - Mr. Sherman no.
N. J - no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N - C- ay - S - C -
ay. Geo - no. [Ayes-4; noes-6; divided-1.]
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enjoy plenary jurisdiction over other federal enclaves,08 and considerable authority
over the "Property" and "Territory" of the United States."° Congress might employ
its taxing power"' to intrude into religion."' In the course of regulating the militia,"2
the army,"' and the navy,"4 Congress and the President could require Quakers and
other conscientious objectors to bear arms" 5 - a potential threat to free exercise." 6
108 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
109 Id art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
"0 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
."' An Old Whig, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 540 (positing use of taxation power to affect religion); ANTIEAU,
supra note 2, at 145 (reporting that some in the Virginia legislature thought the First
Amendment was not sufficiently broad to prevent the federal government from using the
taxation and spending powers to favor certain religions); see also HOWE, supra note 2, at 21
(stating that Congress could use the tax power to affect religion). Otherwise, however, Howe
seems to understate Congress's potential power over religion, stating, "Furthermore, none
of the powers conferred explicitly on Congress could, conceivably, justify a statute making
Christianity, or any special variety thereof, the religion of the nation." Id. Perhaps this is
technically correct, but a full knowledge of the ratification record shows legitimate fears that
the new government could pass such a statute for the District of Columbia and powerfully
direct the property, military, Indian relations, and treaty powers to the same end.
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
' Id. cl. 14.
114 Id,
"' Such a possibility was cause for concern in Pennsylvania. See An Old Whig, PHILA.
INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
540; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 532 (reporting on a speech by William
Findley at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); CentinelIII, PHILA. INDEP. GAZErEER, Nov.
8, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 60 (warning that "as militia
you may be made the unwilling instruments of oppression, under the direction of government;
there is no exemption upon account of conscientious scruples of bearing arms."); Algernon
Sidney II, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Feb. 13, 1788, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 1721, 1725 (Microform Supp.) (claiming that under the Constitution, Quakers,
"Menonists," and others could be forced to bear arms); see also Philadelphiensis, PHILA.
FREEMAN'S J., Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 252.
In regard to religious liberty, the cruelty of the new government will
probably be felt sooner in Pennsylvania than in any state in the union.
The number of religious denominations in this state, who are principled
against fighting or bearing arms, will be greatly distressed indeed. In
the new constitution there is no declaration in their favour; but on the
contrary, the Congress and President are to have an absolute power
over the standing army, navy, and militia; and the president, or rather
emperor, is to be commander in chief. Now, I think, that it will appear
plain, that no exemption whatever from militia duty, shall be allowed
to any set of men, however conscientiously scrupulous they may be
against bearing arms.
Id. (emphasis in original).
The issue also showed up outside the Quaker stronghold of Pennsylvania. Several states
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Congress had the power to deal with Indian tribes" 7 and might use that power to
impact religion, as later happened.' 18 The President and Senate enjoyed an inde-
pendent treaty power" 9 and might agree with a foreign nation that particular
denominations were to be favored within the United States. 2 As antifederalists
pointed out, international agreements had been used that way before.' 2 '
In sum, the federalist representation that the new government would have no
power over religion was inherently less credible than some of their other representa-
tions as to limits on federal authority. One could admit that congressional powers
could not be stretched to govern land titles, agriculture, or civil justice within
existing states,'22 while still recognizing a realistic possibility that Congress might
suppress free exercise in the "Ten Miles Square," draft Quakers, or impose dis-
criminatory taxation.
Accordingly, antifederalists mocked the federalist claim that by not granting
Congress express power over religion, the Constitution left the matter exclusively
adopted or considered proposed amendments exempting men from serving as soldiers if
religious principles forbade. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 553 (quoting an
unsuccessful amendment at the Maryland ratifying convention that provided, "[tihat no
person conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, in any case, shall be compelled person-
ally to serve as a soldier."); 4 ELLIOTr's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 244 (quoting an adopted
amendment at the North Carolina ratifying convention that provided "[T]hat any person
religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent
to employ another to bear arms in his stead.").
16 For legal exemptions for dissenters as an aspect of free exercise, see McConnell, supra
note 2, at 1466-73.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
118 CORD, supra note 2, at 38-39, 45, 59, 63-70 (discussing various measures for
promoting Christianity among the Indians).
"9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
120 E.g., 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 191-92 (quoting Henry Abbott at the North
Carolina ratifying convention, as stating that "[i]t is feared, by some people, that, by the
power of making treaties, they might make a treaty engaging with foreign powers to adopt
the Roman Catholic religion in the United States, which would prevent the people from
worshipping God according to their own consciences."); see also 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 514 (quoting Robert Whitehill) (warning at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention that "[t]reaties may be so made as to absorb the liberty of conscience, trial by
jury, and all our liberties.").
121 Hampden, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 666 ("Treaties may be extended to almost every legislative object
of the general government. Who is it that doth not know that by treaties in Europe the
succession and constitution of many sovereign states hath been regulated."). Charles II who
reigned from 1660 to 1685 was in the pay of the king of France and was more obliging to
English Catholics for that reason.
122 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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to the states. Reflect back to the Virginia ratifying convention, when the stupen-
dous Patrick Henry, orator extraordinaire and scourge of the proposed Constitution,
held the floor:
Wherefore is religious liberty not secured?... There is many
a religious man who knows nothing of argumentative reasoning,
there are many of our most worthy citizens who cannot go
through all the labyrinths of syllogistic, argumentative deduc-
tions, when they think that the rights of conscience are invaded.
This sacred right ought not to depend on constructive, logical
reasoning."'
And again:
That sacred and lovely thing, religion, ought not to rest on the
ingenuity of logical deduction. Holy religion, sir, will be pros-
tituted to the lowest purposes of human policy. What has been
more productive of mischief among mankind than religious
disputes? Then here, sir, is a foundation for such disputes,
when it requires learning and logical deduction to perceive that
religious liberty is secure. 24
123 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 317 (quoting Patrick Henry); see also 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 592 (quoting John Smilie at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention as similarly arguing "Powers undefined are extremely favorable for the
increase of power."); Cincinnatus III: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y. J., Nov. 15, 1787,
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 125.
In equal insecurity, or rather equally at mercy, are we left as to -
liberty of conscience. We find nothing that regards it, except the
following; - "but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualifi-
cation to any office or public trust under the United States." This
exception implies, and necessarily implies, that in all other cases what-
ever liberty of conscience may be regulated. For, though no such power
is expressly given, yet it is plainly meant to be included in the general
powers, or else this exception would have been totally unnecessary -
For why should it be said, that no religious test should be required as
a qualification for office, if no power was given or intended to be given
to impose a religious test of any kind?
Id. See also Philadelphiensis, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 253 ("Since, in the new constitution no provision
is made for securing to these peaceable citizens their religious liberties, it follows then by
implication, that no such provision was intended.").
124 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 318 (remarks of Patrick Henry).
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Yet again:
I trust that gentlemen, on this occasion, will see the great objects
of religion, liberty of the press, trial by jury, interdiction of cruel
punishments, and every other sacred right, secured, before they
agree to that paper [the Constitution]. These most important
human rights are not protected by [Article I, Section 9], '25 which
is the only safeguard in the Constitution. My mind will not be
quieted till I see something substantial come forth in the shape
of a bill of rights.'26
Henry was only one of many to demand a shield for free exercise. Similar demands
came from all throughout the country'27 - and even from outside, for Thomas
125 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (limiting the powers of the federal government).
126 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 462 (remarks of Patrick Henry).
127 This was one of the most common demands for amendment - so common that
exhaustive citation would be as tedious as impossible. Thus, a newspaper article satirizing
antifederalist arguments was entitled "Receipt [Recipe] for an Antifederalist Essay," and
included the following ingredients, among others: "WELL-BORN, nine times -Aristocracy,
eighteen times -Liberty of the Press, thirteen times repeated -Liberty of Conscience once
...."A Receiptfor an Antifederalist Essay, PENN. GAZETTE, Nov. 14, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 103.
The following are a few serious examples, categorized by state:
MASSACHUSETTS: "Z," BOSTON INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 358, 359 (demanding reservation of "rights of
conscience" to avoid establishment of a national church); Mercy Warren, A Columbian
Patriot, Observations on the Constitution (Feb. 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 279 (criticizing the Constitution because "[t]here is no security in
the profered [sic] system ... for ... the rights of conscience.").
NEW YORK: see Brutus II, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 525 (arguing that the right of conscience is an inalienable right).
PENNSYLVANIA: see The Dissent of the Minority ofthe Pennsylvania Convention, PENN.
PACKET (Dec. 18, 1787), in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 18 (proposing as
an amendment that "[t]he right of conscience shall be held inviolable; and neither the
legislative, executive nor judicial powers of the United States shall have authority to alter,
abrogate, or infringe any part of the constitution of the several states, which provide for the
preservation of liberty in matters of religion."); see also 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 399, 459, 592 (quoting various remarks of John Smilie); id, at 400 (quoting
remarks of Robert Whitehill) ("Have we a right to give away the rights of conscience?"); id.
at 597 (setting forth the text of Whitehill's proposed amendment protecting freedom of
conscience); Centine111, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 457, supra note 2, at 466; An Old Whig, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787,
reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 538, supra note 2 at 539-41; A Baptist, FREEMAN'S
J., Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1557, 1558
(Microform Supp.) (calling for alteration in the Constitution to protect free exercise and
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Jefferson, who had not otherwise been involved in the debate, wrote from France
to urge amendment as well. 2 Madison and a few other hard-pressed federalists at
the Virginia convention asserted that explicit protection for religion was unneces-
sary because America's variety of sects would prevent any of them from becoming
too strong. But this religious adaption of Madison's famous theory of factions
129
carried no weight outside his immediate sphere of influence. So the federalists were
left with no choice but one: assent to a term in the Gentlemen's Agreement for an
amendment to protect free exercise.
D. What Did the Founding Generation Mean by "Free Exercise"?
By the phrase "free exercise," the founding generation appears to have meant
freedom of religion for all theists, not just Christians; but not the freedom from
religion sought by atheists and agnostics. To demonstrate the point, let us begin
against an established church).
VIRGINIA: see 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 239 (quoting Richard Henry
Lee's proposal "[T]hat 'the new Constitution proposed for the Government of the U. States
be bottomed upon a declaration, or Bill of Rights, clearly and precisely stating the principles
upon which this Social Compact is founded, to wit; That the rights of Conscience in matters
of Religion shall not be violated... ."'); see also Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund
Randolph, PETERSBURG VA. GAzETrE, Oct. 16, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 368; Richard Henry Lee to SamuelAdams (Oct. 27, 1787), in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 485 ("But they have no reservation in favor of the
Press, Rights of Conscience ... ").
'28 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 482-83:
I will now add what I do not like, first the omission of a bill of rights
providing clearly & without the aid of sophisms for freedom of
religion... to say, as mr Wilson does that a bill of rights was not
necessary because all is reserved in the case of the general government
which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given which is not
reserved, might do for the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is
surely a gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of
the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present
confederation which had declared that in express terms.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith
(Feb. 2, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 500 (advocating
a bill of rights with protection for religion).
129 3 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 93, 330 (James Madison, speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention); id. at 204 (Edmund Randolph, speaking at the same con-
vention); id. at 645 (Zachariah Johnson, speaking at the same convention); see also Letter
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24 & Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 442,448-49 (elaborating on the same theory). For
relevant passages in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, see THE FEDERALISTNO. 10 (James Madison),
supra note 2, at 45-46. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 2, at 270-71.
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with Oliver Ellsworth - a man little known today, but among the most significant
of the founders. Ellsworth was a lawyer and a judge, and he enjoyed the largest
private practice in Connecticut.' a He served as a delegate to the federal conven-
tion, where he was one of only five members on the Committee of Detail - the
committee that produced the first draft of the final document.' In 1796, President
Washington appointed him Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.'32
Ellsworth supported ratification through his influential "Landholder" essays,
written for Connecticut but published more widely. 3 In one of those essays, he
addressed complaints about the lack of a religious test.'34 In the course of a
declamation on the futility of religious tests and the risk that they might be used for
religious persecution, he wrote:
If any test-act were to be made, perhaps the least exceptionable
would be one, requiring all persons appointed to office, to
declare, at the time of their admission, their belief in the being
of a God, and in the divine authority of the scriptures. In favour
of such a test, it may be said, that one who believes these great
truths, will not be so likely to violate his obligations to his
country, as one who disbelieves them; we may have greater
confidence in his integrity. 
135
Ellsworth then discussed the limits of government:
But to come to the true principle, by which this question ought
to be determined: The business of civil government is to protect
the citizen in his rights, to defend the community from hostile
powers, and to promote the general welfare. Civil government
has no business to meddle with the private opinions of the
people. If I demean myself as a good citizen, I am accountable,
not to man, but to God, for the religious opinions which I
embrace, and the manner in which I worship the supreme
being.'36
130 For a short biography of Oliver Ellsworth, see Biographical Directory of the United
States Congress, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=
E000147 (last visited Aug. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Biographical Directory].
131 See Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2, at 270-73.
132 See Biographical Directory, supra note 130.
133 See 14 DoCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 2.
'34 Id. at 450.
13 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 450.
136 Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
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The italicized language makes Ellsworth sounds like a strict separationist, although
that sits oddly (to modem minds) with the reference to God. Here is additional
context:
But while I assert the right of religious liberty; I would not deny
that the civil power has a right, in some cases, to interfere in
matters of religion. It has a right to prohibit and punish gross
immoralities and impieties; because the open practice of these
is of evil example and public detriment. For this reason, I
heartily approve of our laws against drunkenness, profane
swearing, blasphemy, and professed atheism.137
Thus, in Ellsworth's view, government should not meddle with religion, but should
not tolerate atheism.
Ellsworth's outlook was entirely typical. In 1986, Professor Philip Kurland,
one of the nation's most distinguished constitutional historians, sunmarized the
evidence as follows:
[C]ontemporary thinkers relied on God's will to justify nondis-
crimination among any who worshiped a single god. Deists,
Jews, and Mahometans came with the announced protection of
religious freedom, but I am hard put to find any evidence in the
development of legal protection for religious freedom that
indicates any intention to protect atheists. 1
38
More recently, Professor Noah Feldman elaborated: the contemporary justifi-
cation of "free exercise" or "freedom of conscience" depended on religious belief.
Developed over the years by John Locke and many others, the justification was that
the conscience belonged to God, and that it was an act of impiety for civil govern-
ment to impede upon the judgment of conscience as to how to worship God. 39
137 Id.
138 Kurland, supra note 2, at 856.
139 Feldman, supra note 2, at 355-79, 390; see also 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 2,
at 120 (Rev. Phillip Payson speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention).
The great object of religion being God supreme, and the seat of religion
in man being the heart or conscience, i. e., the reason God has given us,
employed on our moral actions, in their most important consequences,
as related to the tribunal of God, hence I infer that God alone is the
God of the conscience, and, consequently, attempts to erect human
tribunals for the consciences of men are impious encroachments upon
the prerogatives of God. Upon these principles, had there been a
religious test as a qualification for office, it would, in my opinion, have
been a great blemish upon the instrument.
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Because, however, this justification presupposed a desire to worship God, the
immunity did not extend to one who denied God. It most certainly did not
contemplate protection for atheism nor, by implication, agnosticism.14 0
Id. See also PENN. PACKET, Jun. 3, 1788, in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
150.
The freedom of its religion, which permits every man to worship his
God in the manner most agreeable to his conscience - That tolerating
spirit of religious freedom, which tramples upon fanaticism and
persecution, and renders mankind friends to Heaven and earth - to
God, as their universal father - to man, as their brother ....
Id. See also Centine111, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 466 (complaining that "there is no declaration, that all men have
a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their
own consciences and understanding."); An Old Whig, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 1,
1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 540 (referring to "the sacred
rights of conscience"); Timothy Meanwell, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 29, 1787,
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 511 ("I should have liked the
constitution much better if our friends of the Convention had inserted the 2d article of the Bill
of Rights prefixed to the Constitution of Pennsylvania. - 'That all men have a natural and
unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own conscience
and understanding.. .. "'); 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 772 (quoting the
"Society of Western Gentlemen" as stating "[t]hat the duty of worshipping [sic] Almighty
God, of enquiring after, and possessing the truth, according to the dictates of conscience, is
equally incumbent on all mankind"). Apparently, Jefferson was one of the few who dissented
from this justification for free exercise, basing it on libertarian grounds instead. McConnell,
supra note 2, at 1451.
"4 Feldman, supra note 2, at 376,425. Even the very few who favored complete toleration
did so in an atmosphere of contempt for atheism. See Alihu, Am. MERCURY, Feb. 18, 1788,
reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 591-92.
Should any body of men, whose characters were unknown to me, form
a plan of government, and prologue it with a long pharisaical harangue
about God and religion, I should suspect a design to cheat and
circumvent us .... There must be (tis objected) some proof, some
evidence that we the people acknowledge the being of a God. Is this a
thing that wants proof? Is this a thing that wants constitutional
establishment in the United States? It is almost the only thing that all
universally are agreed in; everybody believes there is a God; not a man
of common sense in the United States denies or disbelieves it. The fool
hath said in his heart there is no God, but was there ever a wise man
said such a thing? No, not in any age or in any country. Besides, if it
was not so, if there were unbelievers, as it is a matter of faith, it might
as well be admitted; for we are not to bind the consciences of men by
laws or constitutions.... Such an acknowledgment is moreover useless
as a religious test - it is calculated to exclude from office fools only,
who believe there is no God; and the people of America are now
become so enlightened that no fool hereafter (it is hoped) will ever be
promoted to any office or high station.
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In their book, The Godless Constitution, Professors Isaac Kramnick and R.
Lawrence Moore'" rely on Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration to support their
argument that the Constitution creates no preference for religion.'42 For their
argument Locke was an unfortunate choice. In fact, Locke flatly refused to extend
toleration to atheists:
Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the
being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the
bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The
taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all;
besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy
all religion, can have no pretence [sic] of religion whereupon to
challenge the privilege of a toleration.'43
Thus, no matter how unsettling it may be to modem sensibilities (including my
own), the historical record is free from reasonable doubt: The founding generation
saw freedom of religion as dependent on faith in God and would have viewed
freedom of religion for atheists or agnostics as a contradiction in terms. The idea
of free exercise was freedom OF religion not freedom FROM religion. If, as
concluded above, the Establishment Clause rested on contemporary notions of free
exercise, then the Establishment Clause must not have prevented governmental
sponsorship of religion in general.
III. THE RELIGION TERMS IN THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT:
THE CONSTITUTION'S OATHS AND THE BAN ON RELIGIOUS TESTS
The Constitution's ban on religious tests'" - which bears an obvious subject-
matter relationship to the First Amendment's ban on religious establishments - and
its requirement for the oath-taking 4 ' were not amended by the Bill of Rights. Both,
however, were among the "religion terms" of the Gentlemen's Agreement.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
141 KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 2.
142 Id. at 74-78.
143 JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
(Charles L. Sherman ed., 1965) (1689).
'44 This was proposed at the national convention by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina.
See 2 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 335 ("No religious test or qualification shall ever be
annexed to any oath of office under the authority of the United States .... ."); see also id. at
461,468.
145 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives... and the Members
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution .... "); see also id. art. I, § 3, el. 6; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 9.
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The ban on religious tests provoked considerable discussion during the
ratification debates. Most of the participants in those debates believed that free
government worked best when those holding positions of public trust were
committed to moral principles.' Because devotion to one specific religion -
Christianity - was seen as a particularly good assurance of moral conduct, 4 7 the
states limited participation in public life to Christians. 148 Thus, the ban on religious
tests became an issue because it arguably broke the connection between government
service and religion and morality. Antifederalists emphasized that the Constitution
would permit non-Christians (or Catholics 149) to serve in federal office, a develop-
ment they claimed could undermine public virtue and lead to official corruption. 5 °
'6 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 171-72 (quoting Charles Turner as
stating at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, "The world of mankind have [sic] always,
in general, been enslaved and miserable, and always will be, until there is a greater
prevalence of Christian moral principles .... ."). The point is developed at greater length in
HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 66-73.
147 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 199 (quoting David Caldwell as claiming at the
North Carolina ratifying convention that "even those who do not regard religion,
acknowledge that the Christian religion is best calculated, of all religions, to make good
members of society, on account of its morality.").
141 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 22.
Every person who shall be chosen a member of either house, or
appointed to any office or place of trust, before taking his seat, or
entering upon the execution of his office, shall take the following oath,
or affirmation, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to wit:
... "I, A B. do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His
only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore; and
I do acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament to
be given by divine inspiration."
Id
Pennsylvania required the following oath: "I do believe in one God, the creator and
governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the wicked. And I do
acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by Divine inspiration."
PA. CONST. of 1776 § 10.
49 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 148 (noting that Major T. Lusk argued
at the Massachusetts ratifying convention against the Constitution because it sanctioned
slavery and because "he shuddered at the idea that Roman Catholics, Papists, and Pagans
might be introduced into office, and that Popery and the Inquisition may be established in
America.").
1S0 For example, see the following comments:
CONNEcTIcuT: AM. MERCURY, Jan. 21, 1788, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 312,313 (Microform Supp.) ("The fears of many good and worthy men, men
of principle and honor, are alarmed, lest soon the high departments of the nation should be
filled with men of loose principles or no principles at all, as to religion.") (emphasis in
original).
MASSACHUSETrS: 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 118 (reporting that at the
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Massachusetts ratifying convention:
[S]everal gentlemen urged that it [the lack of a religious test] was a
departure from the principles of our forefathers, who came here for the
preservation of their religion; and that it would admit deists, atheists,
&c.,into the general government; and, people being apt to imitate the
examples of the court, these principles would be disseminated, and, of
course [i.e., necessarily], a corruption of morals ensue.).
See also id. at 119:
Col. [William] JONES (of Bristol) thought, that the rulers ought to
believe in God or Christ, and that, however a test may be prostituted in
England, yet he thought, if our public men were to be of those who had
a good standing in the church, it would be happy for the United States,
and that a person could not be a good man without being a good
Christian.
See also id at 44 (noting that Amos Singletary at the Massachusetts ratifying convention
"thought we were giving up all our privileges, as there was no provision that men in power
should have any religion; and though he hoped to see Christians, yet, by the Constitution, a
Papist, or an Infidel, was as eligible as they.").
MARYLAND: Luther Martin, Genuine Information XII, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Feb. 8,
1788, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 89.
The part of the system, which provides that no religious test shall
ever be required . . . was adopted by a very great majority of the
convention, and without much debate, - however, there were some
members so unfashionable as to think that a belief of the existence of
a Deity, and of a state offuture rewards andpunishments would be
some security for the good conduct of our rulers, and that in a Christian
country it would be at least decent to hold out some distinction between
the professors of Christianity and downright infidelity or paganism.
Id. (footnote omitted).
NORTH CAROLINA: At the North Carolina ratifying convention, William Lancaster
supported a religious test and cautioned his fellow delegates:
But let us remember that we form a government for millions not yet in
existence. I have not the art of divination. In the course of four or five
hundred years, I do not know how it will work. This is most certain,
that Papists may occupy that chair, and Mahometans may take it. I see
nothing against it. There is a disqualification, I believe, in every state
in the Union - it ought to be so in this system.
4 ELLIOTr's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 215. See also id. at 192 (quoting Henry Abbot as
pointing out at the North Carolina ratifying convention that "[t]he exclusion of religious tests
is by many thought dangerous and impolitic. They suppose that if there be no religious test
required, pagans, deists, and Mahometans might obtain offices among us, and that the
senators and representatives might all be pagans."); id at 198-99 (Gov. Samuel Johnson)
(summarizing, as a federalist, the antifederalist arguments at the North Carolina ratifying
convention); id. at 199 (Rev. David Caldwell, also speaking at the North Carolina ratifying
convention).
VIRGINIA: LetterXII, Jan. 12, 1788, reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at 310-11. Writing in opposition to the Constitution, the author pointed out, that under it,
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Federalists responded in various ways. Part of their defense was that religious
tests were impious for the same reason as government interference with free
exercise was impious - they intruded on the conscience, God's domain.'5'
Additionally, they pointed out that religious tests were largely ineffective or
counterproductive. Illustrating this response was a speech delivered at the
Massachusetts ratifying convention by the celebrated Reverend Theophilus Parsons:
It has been objected that the Constitution provides no religious
test by oath, and we may have in power unprincipled men,
atheists and pagans. No man can wish more ardently than I do
that all our public offices may be filled by men who fear God
and hate wickedness; but it must remain with the electors to give
the government this security. An oath will not do it. Will an
unprincipled man be entangled by an oath? Will an atheist or a
pagan dread the vengeance of the Christian's God, a being, in
his opinion, the creature of fancy and credulity? It is a solecism
it can be no objection to the elected, that they are Christians, Pagans,
Mahometans, or Jews; that they are of any colour, rich or poor, convict
or not: Hence many men may be elected, who cannot be electors.
Gentlemen who have commented so largely upon the wisdom of the
constitution, for excluding from being elected young men under a
certain age, would have done well to have recollected, that it positively
makes pagans, convicts, &c. eligible.
Id.
On the perceived connection between state -support of religion and morality, see
Feldman, supra note 2, at 394-95.
"1 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 148 (Rev. Isaac Backus, stating at the
Massachusetts ratifying convention, "[R]eligion is ever a matter between God and
individuals; and, therefore, no man or men can impose any religious test, without invading
the essential prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ."); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at 457 (reporting the comment of Benjamin Rush at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention
that "[i]n marking the advantages which are secured to us by the new government, the Doctor
principally enforced the following: ... that religious tests would be abolished .... The
Doctor concluded an animated speech by holding out the new Constitution as pregnant with
an increase of freedom, knowledge, and religion."); Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV:
On the Federal Government, Oct. 21, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 432.
No religious test is ever to be required of any officer or servant of
the United States.... No such impious deprivation of the rights of men
can take place under the new foederal [sic] constitution. The
convention has the honor of proposing thefirst public act, by which
any nation has ever divested itselfof a power, every exercise of which
is a trespass on the Majesty of Heaven.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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in expression. No man is so illiberal as to wish the confining
places of honor or profit to any one sect of Christians; but what
security is it to government, that every public officer shall swear
that he is a Christian? For what will then be called Christianity?
One man will declare that the Christian religion is only an
illumination of natural religion, and that he is a Christian;
another Christian will assert that all men must be happy
hereafter in spite of themselves; a third Christian reverses the
image, and declares that, let a man do all he can, he will
certainly be punished in another world; and a fourth will tell us
that, if a man use any force for the common defence [sic], he
violates every principle of Christianity. Sir, the only evidence
we can have of the sincerity of a man's religion is a good life;
and I trust that such evidence will be required of every candidate
by every elector. That man who acts an honest part to his
neighbor, will, most probably, conduct honorably towards the
public.'52
The possible variations on the term "Christian" listed in this quotation suggest
a third line of response: that theism in general was an adequate predictor of virtue,
especially theism of the sort involving a just God (or gods) and a future state of
rewards and punishments. It followed that a more exacting test was unnecessary,
and being unnecessary, interfered with free exercise. ' Of course, atheists were not
152 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 90. In Massachusetts, ministers took the lead in
arguing against religious tests. See also id. at 118-19 (remarks of Rev. Daniel Shute,
speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); id. at 120 (Rev. Phillips Payson) (same
convention). For other discussions of the impracticality of religious tests, see 4 ELLIOTT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 192-93 (James Iredell, speaking at the North Carolina ratifying
convention); id. at 200 (Samuel Spencer) (same); Alihu, AM. MERCURY, Feb. 18, 1788,
reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 592 ("Such an acknowledgment [of
theism] is moreover useless as a religious test - it is calculated to exclude from office fools
only, who believe there is no God; and the people of America are now become so enlightened
that no fool hereafter (it is hoped) will ever be promoted to any office or high station.");
Oliver Ellsworth, The Landholder, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 451 ("In short, test-laws are utterly ineffectual; they are no security at all; because men of
loose principles will, by an external compliance, evade them. If they exclude any persons,
it will be honest men, men of principle, who will rather suffer an injury, than act contrary to
the dictates of their consciences."); Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Oct.
28, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 504 ("If the person in question
be an unbeliever in these points and would notwithstanding take the oath, a previous test
could have no effect. He would subscribe it as he would take the oath, without any principle
that could be affected by either.").
113 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 316 (Dep.-Gov. Oliver Wolcott, reported
as stating that a religious test would "be exceedingly injurious to the rights of free citizens
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protected from a test of theism for the same reason they were not protected by
provisions guaranteeing free exercise. An atheist was seen as entitled to no freedom
of conscience because he had expelled God from that conscience. 15 4
Supporting a broadly theistic view was the fact that most educated members of
the founding generation had read Cicero,'55 and thus knew that the good moral
character necessary for free government could come from religious sources that
were neither Christian nor even monotheist. 5 ' As stated by Daniel Shute, another
minister at the Massachusetts ratifying convention:
Far from limiting my charity and confidence to men of my own
denomination in religion, I suppose, and I believe, sir, that there
are worthy characters among men of every denomination -
among the Quakers, the Baptists, the Church of England, the
Papists; and even among those who have no other guide, in the
way to virtue and heaven, than the dictates of natural religion.'
... ."); Dentatus, INDEP. GAZETrEER, Jan. 8, 1788, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 1441-42 (Microform Supp.) (complaining of test laws as inconsistent with
free exercise).
15 See supra Part II.D.
'5 See CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 19 (1994).
156 See Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Natura Deorum, in DE NATURA DEORUM ACADEMICA,
6 (H. Rackham trans., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1933) (stating that if religion and holiness are
taken out of public life, "perturbatio vitae sequitur et magna confusio, atque haut scio an
pietate adversus deos sublatafides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissima
virtus iustitia tollatur," which I have translated as "a great upset of life follows and great
confusion; and I don't quite know that if piety toward the gods is taken away whether faith
and comradeship among the human race and one great moral quality, justice, wouldn't be
lost"). In Omichund v. Barker, Willes 538, 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1744), a famous case
referenced by James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention, see infra note 175 and
accompanying text, the court had referred generally and extensively to non-Christian sources,
and particularly to Cicero, to illustrate the binding effect of an oath among all theists. Id.,
Willes at 545-47, 125 Eng. Rep. at 1314.
'1 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 119. See also 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
2, at 197 (quoting James Iredell, as stating at the North Carolina ratifying convention that
"[m]en at length considered that there were many virtuous men in the world who had not had
an opportunity ofbeing instructed either in the Old or New Testament, who yet very sincerely
believed in a Supreme Being and in a future state of rewards and punishments."); Tench
Coxe, An American Citizen IV. On the Federal Government, Oct. 21, 1787, in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 432 ("No religious test is ever to be required of
any officer or servant of the United States. The people may employ any wise and good
citizen in the execution of the various duties of the government.") (emphasis in original).
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Thus, the key to moral conduct was not belief in a particular religion, but belief
in divinity. Reverend Shute's concession to adherents of "natural religion" (deism)
shows that in his view the divinity need not even be a personal God responsible for
a future state of rewards and punishments. Other advocates of the theistic view did
not go quite so far. Chancellor Edmund Pendleton, a key Virginia federalist and
president of his state's ratifying convention, thought at least a belief in future
judgment was necessary.' James Iredell, the federalist floor leader at the North
Carolina convention, held a similar view. 9 But the general idea was that theism,
and not specifically Christianity, was sufficient. One federalist wag satirized
antifederalist religious parochialism in this way:
[The Constitution] admits to legislation, 1 st. Quakers, who
will make the blacks saucy, and at the same time deprive us of
the mean of defence [sic] - 2dly. Mahometans, who ridicule
the doctrine of the trinity - 3dly. Deists, abominable wretches
4thly. Negroes, the seed of Cain - 5thly. Beggars, who when
set on horseback will ride to the devil - 6thly. Jews, &c. &c.
It gives the command of the whole militia to the President
- should he hereafter be a Jew, our dear posterity may be
ordered to rebuilt Jerusalem.
160
158 See Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Oct. 8, 1787), reprinted in 10
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1774.
My last Criticism you will probably laugh at, tho' it is really a
Serious one wth. me. why require an Oath From Public Officers, and
yet interdict all Religious Tests, their only Sanction? Those hitherto
adopted have been narrow & illiberal, because designed to preserve
Established modes of Worship; But since a belief of a Future State
of Rewards & Punishments, can alone give consciensious [sic]
Obligation to Observe an Oath, It would seem that Test should be
required or Oaths Abolished.
Id.
159 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 197-98.
'60 Curtiopolis, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 401.
In Pennsylvania, an anonymous federalist author attacked named antifederalists for
supporting test laws that excluded even some Christians from government. See A Citizen of
Philadelphia, PENN. GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 658.
In the list of the signers of the protest of the minority of the
Convention against the Federal Constitution, we find six (and three of
them the only speakers against it in the Convention) whose names are
upon record as the friends of paper money, and the advocates for the
late unjust test law of Pennsylvania, which for near ten years excluded
the Quakers, Mennonists, Moravians, and several other sects scrupulous
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Finally, federalists responded that if one believed religious tests to be effective,
then one should be comforted because the Constitution already contained a test of
theism in its requirement that officeholders take oaths."'6 Early in the ratification
process, Madison made this point in a letter to Virginia's Chancellor Edmund
Pendleton: "Is not a religious test as far as it is necessary, or would operate,
involved in the oath itself?"' 62 Deputy-Governor Oliver Wolcott relied on the same
argument in support of the Constitution at the Connecticut ratifying convention.'63
The South Carolina convention even proposed an amendment to codify this
understanding," 4 as did Virginia's Society of Western Gentlemen:
against war, from a representation in our government.
• . .The persons are William Findley, John Smilie, Robert
Whitehill, Adam Orth, Nicholas Lutz, Abraham Lincoln.
In the 302d page of the same book, we find a report declaring the
Quakers, Moravians, etc. who, from conscientious scruples, decline
taking part in the war, to be "enemies to liberty and the rights of
mankind.. ." which report is agreed to, as appears in the list of the
yeas, by the same William Findley, John Smilie, Robert Whitehill,
Adam Orth, Nicholas Lutz, Abraham Lincoln.
These men certainly are not in earnest when they talk and write of
liberty and of the sacred rights of conscience.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
16 The requirement for oaths to support the Constitution came from the Virginia Plan. See
I FARRAND, supra note 2, at 22 (May 29, 1787) ("Resd. that the Legislative Executive &
Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles
of Union[.]"). Among federal convention debates, see also id at 122, 203-04; 2 FARRAND,
supra note 2, at 84; id at 87 ("Mr. Wilson said he was never fond of oaths, considering them
as a left handed security only. A good Govt. did not need them. and a bad one could not or
ought not to be supported.").
62 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Oct. 28, 1787), reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 504.
163 Oliver Wolcott, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 316 ("I do not see the necessity of such a Test as
some gentlemen wish for. The constitution enjoins an oath upon all the Officers of the United
States. This is a direct appeal to that God who is the avenger of perjury. Such an appeal to
him is a full acknowledgment of his being and providence. An acknowledgment of these
great truths is all that the gentlemen contend for.") (footnote omitted).
'64 See 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 72 ("Resolved, That the 3d section
of the 6th article ought to be amended, by inserting the word other between the words no and
religious.") (emphasis in original). That the South Carolina resolution was a codification
rather than a substantive change was publicized at the time. Roger Sherman, A Citizen ofNew
Haven, N.Y. PACKET, Mar. 24, 1789, reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
2, at 222 ("The amendment proposed by the Convention of South-Carolina, respecting
religious tests, is an ingenious one, but not very important, because the Constitution as it now
stands, will have the same effect, as it would have with that amendment."); see also ANTEAU,
supra note 2, at 106, 117 (discussing the reason for this proposed amendment).
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[F]or the more general diffusion of benevolence, hospitality,
and undissembled honesty, among all ranks of people, the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, and worship
withoutpreference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within the
United States.
.... [B]ut no other religious Test shall ever be required...
than a belief in the one only true God, who is the rewarder of
the good, and the punishment of the evil. 65
The view that oaths and theism were necessarily connected was more than
merely a view: It was the law. The essence of an oath was an appeal to God to
witness the truth of what one said. Thus, the oath of an atheist received no
recognition. The English courts so ruled prior to American independence, 66 and
American courts acknowledged the principle as late as 1823.167
16' The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Apr.
30, May 7, 1788, reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 772, 779.
166 See Ramskissenseat v. Barker, 1 Atk. 19,20,26 Eng. Rep. 13, 14 (Ch. 1739) (holding
that "[t]he general rule is, that all persons who believe a God, are capable of an oath; and
what is universally understood by an oath, is, that the person who takes it, imprecates the
vengeance of God upon him, if the oath he takes is false.") (emphasis in original); Omichund
v. Barker, Willes 538, 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1744) (a later proceeding in the same case,
holding that an oath is a call on God as a witness, and that all witnesses who believe in a God
who will judge them, but none others, are competent to take oaths); also reported Omychund
v. Barker, I Atk. 22, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch. 1744) and Ormichund v. Barker, 1 Wils. K.B. 84,
95 E.R. 506 (Ch. 1745).
The Ramkissenseat-Omichund-Omychund-Ormichund decisions rejected the narrower
view that the oath-taker had to believe in the holiness of biblical scripture. See HAWKINS,
supra note 2, at 434 ("It seems agreed to be a good Exception [to the competency of a
witness] That the witness is an Infidel' that is, as I take it, that he believes neither the Old nor
the New Testament to be the Word of God, on one of which our Laws require the Oath
should be administered."). See also 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *6b (holding that "infidels"
could not take oaths), and the discussion in Ormichund, supra, and Omychund, supra.
167 Butts v. Swartwood, 2 Cow. 431 (N.Y. Sup. Ct: 1823). See also Jackson ex dem. Tuttle
v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
By the law of England, which has been adopted in this state, it is fully
and clearly settled, that infidels who do not believe in a God, or if they
do, do not think that he will either reward orpunish them in the world to
come, cannot be witnesses in any case, nor under any circumstances;
because an oath cannot possibly be any tie or obligation upon them.
Mahometans may be sworn on the Koran; Jews on the Pentateuch, and
Gentoos and others, according to the ceremonies of their religion, what-
ever may be the form. It is appealing to God to witness what we say, and
invoking punishment, if what we say be false.
Id. at 103 (emphasis in original). See also Hunscom v. Hunscom, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 184
(1818) (recognizing the common law rule, but applying it only as going to the credibility of
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The most forceful and elaborate federalist exposition of the tenet that an oath
was a sufficient test of theism for official functions came from James Iredell at the
North Carolina ratifying convention. His speech is worth examining at length. It
was delivered late in the ratification process - on July 30, 1788, less than a year
before Madison introduced the First Amendment in Congress. The speaker was a
source of great reliability and prestige. Iredell was not only the North Carolina
federalist floor leader, but a former judge and state attorney general, member of the
governor's council, and a future associate justice of the United States Supreme
Court. In substance and in nuance Iredell's speech represented part of the fully-
developed federalist case on the Constitution and religion.
Iredell began by defining an oath as a "solemn appeal to the Supreme Being, for
the truth of what is said, by a person who believes in the existence of a Supreme
Being and in a future state of rewards and punishments, according to that form
which will bind his conscience most."' 68 Thus, the very requirement of an oath
implied exclusion of atheists and agnostics. After all, Iredell said, "there are few
people so grossly ignorant or barbarous as to have no religion at all."' 69
But could oaths be taken properly only by Christians? No, he said: "It was long
held that no oath could be administered but upon the New Testament, except to a
Jew, who was allowed to swear upon the Old. 70 According to this notion, none but
Jews and Christians could take an oath; and heathens [i.e., pagans] were altogether
excluded.'' 7 However, Anglo-American law had become much more liberal than
that:
At length, by the operation of principles of toleration, these
narrow notions were done away. Men at length considered that
there were many virtuous men in the world who had not had an
opportunity of being instructed either in the Old or New
Testament, who yet very sincerely believed in a Supreme Being,
a witness); Rutherford v. Moore, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 404 (D.C. Cir. 1807) (allowing disbelief
in God to go to the competency of the witness).
168 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 196.
169 Id. at 197.
170 Hawkins, supra note 2; see also Rex v. Bosworth, 2 Strange 1112, 93 Eng. Rep. 1066,
1067 (K.B. 1739):
... [T]he law does not require the New Testament in all cases,
particularly as to evidence given by Jews. But the reason of that is,
because all Courts desire to have the best security they can for the truth
of the evidence, and therefore as it is known they have a more solemn
obligation to speak the truth, when sworn on the Old Testament, it is
for that reason allowed.
17' ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 196-97.
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and in a future state of rewards and punishments. It is well
known that many nations entertain this belief who do not
believe either in the Jewish or Christian religion. 72
"Indeed, if none but Christians or Jews could be examined upon oath, many
innocent persons might suffer for want of the testimony of others,"' 73 he added. For
this reason, if for no other, the oaths of believers in more exotic religions were
freely admissible:
A very remarkable instance also happened in England, about
forty years ago, of a person who was admitted to take an oath
according to the rites of his own country, though he was a
heathen. He was an East Indian .... Not believing either in the
Old or New Testament, he could not be sworn in the accustomed
manner, but was sworn according to the form of the Gentoo'74
religion, which he professed, by touching the foot of a priest. It
appeared that, according to the tenets of this religion, its
members believed in a Supreme Being, and in a future state of
rewards and punishments. It was accordingly held by the
judges, upon great consideration, that the oath ought to be
received; they considering that it was probable those of that
religion were equally bound in conscience by an oath according
to their form of swearing, as they themselves were by one of
theirs; and that it would be a reproach to the justice of the
country, if a man, merely because he was of a different religion
from their own, should be denied redress of an injury he had
sustained. Ever since this great case, it has been universally
considered that, in administering an oath, it is only necessary to
inquire if the person who is to take it, believes in a Supreme
Being, and in a future state of rewards and punishments... ..
It is, however, necessary that such a belief should be enter-
tained, because otherwise there would be nothing to bind his
172 Id. at 197.
173 Id.
174 A Telugu or Dravidian Hindu. Cf. 1 SHORTEROxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1086 (5th
ed. 2002).
175 For varying reports on the litigation, see Ormichund v. Barker, 1 Wils. K.B. 84, 95
E.R. 506 (Ch. 1745); Omichund v. Barker, Willes 538, 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1744);
Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch. 1739); Ramkissenseat v. Barker, 1
Atk. 19, 26 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1739). See also Fachina v. Sabine, 2 Strange 1104, 93 Eng.
Rep. 1061 (Council 1738) (approving permission for a Muslim witness to swear on the
Koran).
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conscience that could be relied on; since there are many cases
where the terror of punishment in this world for perjury could
not be dreaded.'76
Thus, whatever the drafters' motivation for inserting in the Constitution the
requirement of oaths and the ban on religious tests, 1' the ratification-era representa-
tion was that the oath requirement served as a theistic test'78 and that theism was an
adequate religious requirement for government service.
IV. THE RELIGION TERMS IN THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT:
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
We have seen that by the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement, the policy
against establishment was designed to further the policy of free exercise, and that
free exercise extended to all theists, but only to theists. We have seen further that
government service was to be open to all theists, but only to theists. It is logical to
deduce, therefore, that the Establishment Clause was designed to protect all theists,
but only theists, and that the Clause permitted government to support all faiths on
a non-preferential basis. This deduction is supported by a plethora of historical
evidence.
176 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 197-98.
'7 I am indebted to Professor Jessie Hill for her observation that the federalist ratification-
era defensive argument for the ban on religious tests may not have reflected the drafters'
reasons for inserting the test.
178 Another way to reach the same result was to argue that an official statement of theism
would not contradict the ban on religious tests. This was William Williams's approach.
Williams indicated that while he did not favor a religious test, he would have gladly accepted
constitutional wording acknowledging the existence and moral judgment of God. For more
on this, see the exchange between Ellsworth as the "Landholder" and William Williams in
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 589-90, 593. In the exchange, Williams
expressed support for an amendment to the Preamble to add the following words:
We the people of the United States, in a firm belief of the being and
perfections of the one living and true God ... He will require of all
moral agents an account of their conduct, that all rightful powers
among men are ordained of, and mediately derived from God, therefore
in a dependence on His blessing and acknowledgment of His efficient
protection ....
Letter from William Williams to the Printer, AM. MERCURY, Feb. 11, 1788, reprinted in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 589.
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A. Evidence that the Establishment Clause Protected Only Theists
1. Fostering Religion
There is an important background fact tending to show that the Establishment
Clause left government free to promote religion: There was a very broad consensus
that government should foster religion. To be sure, the influence of the Enlighten-
ment had left people less fervid in their faith than those in some prior ages. When
federalist Benjamin Rush argued in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that the
proposed Constitution was the product of divine inspiration and adoption of it a
divine command, 179 he was widely mocked for his superstition.80 Rush later backed
179 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 594-95.
Here the Doctor showed the connection between the want ofjustice and
fidelity in government to individuals, and of individuals to government,
and every branch of moral obligation. From this failure of political
obligation arose the want of justice between man and man, the
difficulty of borrowing and the danger of lending money, the
oppressions of landlords, the frauds of tenants, and the numerous
instances of conjugal infelicity and divorces, etc. among the lower
classes of people; and lastly, the deficiency in parishes to pay their
ministers agreeably to their subscriptions. This last instance of a failure
in moral obligation, the Doctor lamented, as having a melancholy
influence upon the happiness of our country; for, said he, where public
worship is not maintained, it will be difficult to preserve religion; and
where there is no religion, there will be no morals. Where there are no
morals, there can be no government, and where there is no government,
there can be no liberty.
... Here the Doctor added, that he believed the same voice that
thundered on Mount Sinai, "thou shalt notsteal," now proclaimed in
our ears, by a number of plain and intelligible providences, "thou shalt
not reject the new federal government."
Id. Rush later complained about this report of his speech and claimed that what he actually
said was more nuanced.
180 According to the editors of DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, "Newspaper writers in
Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts criticized Rush's assertion that the Constitution
was divinely inspired." 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 48. Competing versions
of the speech were reprinted widely. Id; see also 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 596 (reporting that Robert Whitehill "regretted that so imperfect a work should have been
ascribed to God"); William Findley, Hampden, Prrr. GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 663-64, stating that "[s]uch characters may also
be expected to promise us such extravagantly flattering advantages to arise from it, as if it
was accompanied with such miraculous divine energy as divided the Red Sea and spake with
thunder on Mount Sinai.") (footnote omitted); Helvidius Priscus 1H, BOSTON INDEP. CHRON.,
Jan. 10, 1787, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 333.
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down from his claim that the Constitution was divinely inspired, but still maintained
that the ratification certainly was.' That Rush had gone too far is suggested by
Gouverneur Morris's observation on varying claims that the Constitution was the
fruit of divine or demonic influence. "Medio tutissimus ibis," he wrote:'8 2 you are
safest if you go down the middle.'83
But, then again, Morris was a man of the world, and to return to the main point,
the contemporaneous "middle" was quite a bit more religious than it is today. One
is reminded of the observation by that proto-Whig whose legal commentaries
educated so many of founding generation's lawyers, Sir Edward Coke: "[Iln religion
... if a man go too much on the right hand, he goes to superstition, if too much on
the left, to profaneness and atheism. And take away reverence, you shall never have
obedience .... "184
The ratification record is full of invocations of the deity by people other than
Rush'85 - and not mainly, or principally, from religious outliers. Madison, who
Yet it is not probable the metaphisical [sic] disquisitions of a southern
doctor, will persuade the world that the majority of the late
CONVENTION were so much the peculiar favourites of heaven as to
receive an immediate inspiration for the model of a government, that
should subjugate a country which appears to those who are really
religious, and who believe in a providential direction, to have been
remarkably under divine protection in the various steps that led to its
independence.
Id. (footnote omitted); The Minority of the Connecticut Convention, PHILA. INDEP.
GAZETTEER, Jan. 21-24, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 570
("[T]hey have been told by their leaders it is an excellent form of government, given from
heaven."). Rush also had proposed unsuccessfully that the Pennsylvania ratifying convention
open each session with a prayer. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 328.
181 See Benjamin Rush, Observations on the Fourth ofJuly Procession in Philadelphia,
PENN. MERCURY, July 15, 1788, reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
266.
I do not believe that the Constitution was the offspring of inspiration,
but I am as perfectly satisfied, that the union of the states, in its form
and adoption, is as much the work of a divine providence, as any of the
miracles recorded in the old and new testament were the effects of a
divine power.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
182 Letter from Gouverneur Morris to James LaCaze (Feb. 21, 1788), in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 171 ("While some have boasted it as a Work from
Heaven others have given it a less righteous origin and charged it to the old great Devil.
Medio tutissimus ibis[.]").
183 Author's translation.
'84 3 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 1198 (Steve
Sheppard ed., 2003).
185 E.g., MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 565 ("And may the guardian God of our 'dear country' inspire the Convention of
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was relatively skeptical about the claims of religion,"' was not skeptical enough to
refrain from interpreting American successes as the product of divine favor." 7
Many others placed a similar interpretation on events.'
this Commonwealth with wisdom, disinterestedness and patriotism equal to the display of
those virtues in our sister States who have already erected Three Pillars of the glorious
Fabrick [sic] ofthe Federal Republick [sic].") (emphasis added); Aristides [Alexander Contee
Hanson], REMARKS ON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Jan. 31-Mar. 27,
1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 517,548 ("Should Heaven,
in its wrath, inflict blindness on the people of America; should they reject this fair offer of
permanent safety and happiness.... ."); William Penn I1, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Jan. 3, 1788,
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1437 (microform supp.)
(recommending "waiting with confidence in HIM who constantly watches over his favorite
creature man") (capitalization and emphasis in original).
186 He frequently expressed skepticism as to whether organized religion was a force for
good. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 19 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 94-95; see also
id. at 270-71; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24 & Nov. 1, 1787),
in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 448.
187 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 184-85.
The real wonder is, that so many difficulties [of drafting the
Constitution] should have been surmounted; and surmounted with a
unanimity almost as unprecedented, as it must have been unexpected.
It is impossible for any man of candour [sic] to reflect on this
circumstance, without partaking of the astonishment. It is impossible
for the man of pious reflection, not to perceive in it a finger of that
Almighty Hand, which has been so frequently and signally extended to
our relief in the critical stages of the revolution.
Id.
188 See, e.g., Foederal [sic] Constitution, PENN. GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 362.
The philosophers will no longer consider a republic as an impracticable
form of government; and pious men of all denominations will thank
God for having provided, in our foederal [sic] constitution, an Ark, for
the preservation of the remains of the justice and liberties of the world.
Id. at 364. See also 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 249 (remarks of Samuel
Johnson) (stating at the Connecticut ratifying convention, "Though no enthusiast, I cannot
but impute it to a signal intervention of divine providence, that a convention from States
differing in circumstances, interests, and manners, should be so harmonious in adopting one
grand system."); MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 19, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 569.
So far as the discussion of the Constitution has proceeded, the defence
[sic] it has received is astonishing - divine providence on this
occasion, affords one of those few opportunities which occur in the
revolution of human affairs, for the unfolding and displaying the
amazing powers of the human mind - and from the progress already
made in convincing those who were before unconvinced, and bringing
to view the latent perfections of the system ....
Id. See also Letter from Simeon Baldwin to James Kent (Mar. 8, 1788), in 16
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Some people remained firm adherents of - and here is an opportunity to use
a famous word - antidisestablishmentarianism: They believed in some sort of
direct preference or "establishment" for favored kinds of religion, 'which they
justified as necessary to promote public virtue. 9 Religion had, in the words of law
and economics, "positive externalities" with "public good" characteristics that
rendered it worthy of compulsory support.' 90 The most commonly-cited illustration
was a negative one: "Rogues' Island" (Rhode Island), where immorality and bad
faith seemed to have run riot. 9' It was not coincidental, some said, that Rhode
Island was the place with the highest wall of separation between church and state.' 92
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 350-51.
I must believe that the supreme being, whose hand is so visible in the
settlement of this Country - in its rapid population - the extent of
territory over which the People have spread - in the general diffusion
of knowledge among them, which is not equalled [sic] by the people of
any territory on earth - & in, the surprizing [sic] union of the whole
in the Cause of Liberty - has designed something great, noble,
glorious from such a Country - such a people - such a revolution.
And I will add from such a change in the Consti[tu]tion as the United
Wisdom of the U.S. has proposed, from the most perfect models of
Govt. both in Theory & practice which have appeared on earth & been
sanctioned by the approbation of the wise politicians who have gone
before us[.]
Id.
's Cf. supra notes 147 and 149 and accompanying text.
190 HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 67. Those who opposed established religions sometimes
were accused of wanting a "wall of separation" between church and state - a phrase that,
far from being an ideal, was an accusation. Id, at 65, 66, 68; see also McCornell, supra note
2, at 1441 (noting that the Virginia religious assessment proposal was based on moral
grounds); HOWE, supra note 2, at 26-27 (outlining the externality theory).
"9' See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 28 (remarks of Gov. Edmund
Randolph) (stating at the Virginia ratifying convention, "Rhode Island - in rebellion against
integrity - Rhode Island plundered all the world by her paper money; and, notorious for her
uniform opposition to every federal duty....").
192 See, e.g., Foederal [sic] Constitution, PENN. GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 365 ("See, in Rhode Island, the bonds of society
and the obligations of morality dissolved by paper money and tender laws."); see also An
American: To Richard Henry Lee, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 174.
Have not the rights of property been violated & religion & morality
trampled under foot by instalment [sic] & suspension Laws, by a paper
legal tender (in case of suit) in six states, by pine-baren laws to
discharge specific & pecuniary contracts in every species of property
however worthless in itself or useless and inconvenient to the creditor.
Id. (strikeout in original).
This general repudiation of the regime in Rhode Island renders slightly ridiculous the
claim that the Establishment Clause was inspired by the thoughts of Roger Williams. Cf.
HOWE, supra note 2, at 5-8 (tracing the phrase "wall of separation" to Williams);
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As Connecticut Representative Benjamin Huntington's sarcastic observations in the
first Congress were summarized: "By the charter of Rhode Island, no religion could
be established by law; [I] could give a history of the effects of such a regulation;
indeed the people [are] now enjoying the blessed fruits of it."' 93
One did not have to be an establishmentarian to favor direct government
intervention in favor of religion. There was wide support for laws designed to
reinforce respect for religion. Among these were penalties - often harsh ones -
imposed for blasphemy.'94 Even Thomas Jefferson, the arch-secularist of his time,
supported such measures.'95 State government practices during the 1776-1789
period included extensive public assistance to a wide range of religious denomina-
tions. 1
96
Some denied it was the proper role of government - at least of the federal
government - to promote particular doctrines or sects directly. Yet even these
believed it proper for government to promote morality by fostering faith
indirectly'97 and to promote faith by fostering morality. 198 The American Mercury
editorialized that "[t]he advancement of religion, which beyond dispute is of
infinitely the greatest moment, is not directly the object of civil government;" 99 but
"Happy indeed if civil government might subserve [religion's] interest!"' 00 Laws
establishing a just order ensured that the vicious could not prey upon the virtuous.
As the essayist the "Foreign Spectator" opined in urging that the Constitution be
adopted, the
good of all denominations reflect, that the common interest of
religion, and the honest predelection [sic] you have for your
particular modes of worship, both require the independency,
safety, and general welfare of your country [and] shudder at the
HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 38-45,50-53 (discussing Williams's views and anticlericalism
and denying that they were particularly influential at the founding).
193 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 730. Actually, Rhode Island, that reputed refuge oftolerance,
barred Jews from citizenship and Catholics from public office. McConnell, supra note 2, at
1425-26.
4 See ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 78-80 (describing some existing penalties).
'9' Cf. CORD, supra note 2, at 140 (citing Jefferson's support for laws banning profane
swearing).
196 See ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 62-86 (outlining such practices). See also id. at 121-22
(describing the state of public opinion).
19 Id. at 89-91 (collecting contemporaneous comments on the obligation of government
to promote religion and virtue).
198 HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 76-77.
199 AM. MERCURY, Jan. 21, 1788, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 312,
314-15 (Microform Supp.).
200 Id. at 315.
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impieties and outrages on humanity committed by monsters in
human form in the scenes of general anarchy.2"'
Because of the overwhelming consensus that government should foster religion
and morality, whether or not the Constitution would do so became a criterion by
which people judged the document. The Poughkeepsie Country Journal summa-
rized differences between federalists and antifederalists thus:
[H]ere, a very decided majority think (and with them thy friend)
that a union of the American States, as exemplified in the new
constitution, is friendly to property; consistent with freedom;
and favorable to morality and religion. Whereas in thy county
I am told many think exactly the reverse.
I think it [the Constitution] also favorable to the morals of
the people. For if jealousies, factions, cabals and war have a
tendency to corrupt the manners[,] that political situation which
prevents jealousies, factions, cabals and war is desirable on a
moral account: and if on a moral, certainly on a religious.2 2
20' Nicholas Collin, Foreign Spectator, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Oct. 2, 1787, reprinted
in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 292. See also Meeting of Philadelphia
Association of Baptist Churches, N.Y. PACKET, Oct. 12 1787, reprinted in id at 374-75.
After finishing the particular business on which they met as a religious
body, it was agreed to incorporate with their general circular letter, the
following recommendation to their people of the proposed plan of the
Foederal [sic] Government - which has been handed to the Printers
by a correspondent, and redounds much to their honor as a society.
... [T]is favourable opportunity offered to establish an EFFICIENT
government; which, we hope may, under God, secure our invaluable
rights, both civil and religious.
Id. (capitalization and emphasis in original). See also 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
2, at 186 (reporting a squib from the PENN. GAZETrE, Oct. 17, 1787).
A minister of the Gospel, through the medium of our paper, begs leave
to ask, whether men can be serious in regard to the Christian religion,
who object to a government that is calculated to promote the glory of
GOD, by establishing peace, order and justice in our country? - and
whether it would not be better for such men to renounce the Christian
name, and to enter into society with the Shawanese or Mohawk Indians,
than to attempt to retain the blessings of religion and civilization, with
their licentious ideas of government.
Id. (footnote omitted) (capitalization in original).
202 POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Mar. 18, 1778, reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 409-10 (emphasis in original).
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As was true of other foundational values, such as liberty and republicanism, the
sides disagreed on the application - but not on the basic principle: 20 3 Government
should, directly or indirectly, foster religion. In this climate of public opinion, no
Establishment Clause erecting a "wall of separation" between religion and state ever
would have been adopted or even seriously proposed.
2. The Faith-Based Ideology of Disestablishment
Two other clues to the theistic orientation of the Establishment Clause are the
identity of those who lobbied for disestablishment and the justifications they
advanced. The disestablishment coalition was not composed of atheists, agnostics
- or even deists or unitarians. It was comprised of religious enthusiasts who
certainly did not favor government neutrality on the subject of religion in general.2 °4
In other words, they shared the public consensus that government should foster
religion.20 5 Moreover, these groups would have perceived any suggestion that they
wanted a "wall of separation" between state and faith not as a compliment, nor even
as a description, but as an insult.20 6 For them, the relationship between good
government and religion was interactive and symbiotic, rather than rigid and
distant.20
7
It is a curious fact that strict separationists often celebrate Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785)208 and Jefferson's and
Madison's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (1786)209 as testimony for their
views. The premier example of this is the Supreme Court's reliance on those
203 See Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution's Property
Clause: The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 329, 337-39 (2005)
(summarizing some common constitutional values held by the founding generation).
204 ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 52-53 (identifying Presbyterians and Baptists as leaders in
the Virginia disestablishment battle); HowE, supra note 2, at 8-9; McConnell, supra note 2,
at 1438-41 (noting that establishment was opposed by intense religious sects). For an
example of a Baptist tract from the ratification era, see A Baptist, FREEMAN'S J., Jan. 23,
1788, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1557-58 (Microform Supp.)
(expressing fear that under the Constitution the federal government could establish a hostile
religion).
205 See supra Part IV.A. 1.
206 HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 65-68.
207 id.
208 See MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 44-45 (discussing the background of the
Remonstrance).
209 This reliance no doubt arises from the fact that the Memorial and Remonstrance
declares that religion is "wholly exempt" from the cognizance of civil society. This was,
however, quite an atypical view, and not part of the context of the First Amendment. See
supra Part II.D.
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documents in Everson v. Board of Education21° and Flast v. Cohen.21' One reason
such reliance is curious is that, as already noted, Jefferson had little to do with
adoption of the First Amendment, and Madison intimated that the measure did not
express his own views."' But the more important reason is both the Remonstrance
and the Statute rest their justification squarely on the demands of religion and of
God.
The Remonstrance was directed specifically against an "establishment of
religion" - taxes imposed to support Christianity. It states in part:
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence." The Religion then of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man . ... This right is in its nature an unalienable
right.... because what is here a right towards men, is a duty
towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the
Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be
acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time
and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society,
he must be considered as a subject of the Governour of the
Universe .. 213
The Statute is, as its name suggests, a measure protecting free exercise, but it
decries establishments as well:
Whereas, Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all
attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or
by civil incapacitations [sic] tend only to beget habits of
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of
the holy author of our religion, who being Lord, both of body
and mind yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as
210 330 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1947).
211 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (citing the Remonstrance for the position that "[t]he
concern of Madison and his supporters was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately
would be the victim if government could employ its taxing and spending powers to aid one
religion over another or to aid religion in general.") (emphasis added).
212 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing Jefferson's role); supra notes
67, 73-75, and infra note 289 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's concessions).
213 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (1785),
in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CoNsTrTUIoN 82 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
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was in his Almighty power to do, that the impious presumption
of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who,
being themselves but fallible and uninspired men have assumed
dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions
and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as
such endeavouring to impose them on others, hath established
and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world
and through all time; that to compel a man to furnish contribu-
tions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical . 214
In both we see precisely the same justification at work for disestablishment that we
saw supporting free exercise and the ban on religious tests: mankind's duty to
God.2" 5 Remove the theism, and you remove the justification.
During the debate over the Constitution, the parties specifically relied on theism
as a basis for proposed constitutional amendments prohibiting a federal establish-
ment. The Virginia ratifying convention, for example, proposed an amendment
stating in part:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence.., and that no particular
religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by
law, in preference to others.216
The North Carolina ratifying convention adopted very similar language," 7 heeding,
among others, the words of James Iredell: "The divine Author of our religion never
214 The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (Jan. 16, 1786), available at http://www.
Iva. lib.va.us/whatwedo/kl2/bor/vsrftext.htm#trans (emphasis added) (last visited Aug. 25,
2005).
215 See, e.g., supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
216 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 659 (emphasis added).
217 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 244.
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence; and therefore all men have an equal, natural, and
unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society
ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others.
Id. See also id. at 208 (quoting Richard Spaight at the North Carolina ratifying convention
as stating, "As to the subject of religion ..... [n]o sect is preferred to another [by the
Constitution]. Every man has a right to worship the Supreme Being in the manner he thinks
proper.").
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wished for its support by worldly authority. Has he not said that the gates of hell
shall not prevail against it?"2 8
Shortly after Connecticut ratified the Constitution, one William Williams -
who had voted for the Constitution at his state's ratifying convention - publicly
challenged Ellsworth, anonymously writing in his "Landholder" identity, to state
whether, despite Ellsworth's opposition to religious tests, he would have accepted
wording in the Constitution's Preamble acknowledging the existence and moral
judgment of God. Ellsworth affirmed that he would support such language.2"9 As
noted earlier, there was no constitutional protection, in his opinion - or in almost
anyone else's - for "professed atheism."220
3. An Objection, and a Response, on the Theistic Basis for the Establishment
Clause
Advocates of the modem "strict separation" and "neutrality" approaches to the
Establishment Clause maintain that the Clause prohibits official aid or preference
for religion over non-religion.22" ' The effect of this approach, of course, is to assure
atheism or agnosticism equal standing with religion for constitutional purposes.
Probably the most respected legal historian in this camp is Professor Leonard
W. Levy, who expounds it in his 1994 book, The Establishment Clause: Religion
and the First Amendment. He reasons as follows:
" The founding generation meant by the word "establishment" not only
exclusive establishments but also systems that subsidized Christianity or
Protestantism generally.222
* Seven states had either general Christian or general Protestant "establish-
ments" at the time the First Amendment was ratified: Connecticut,
218 Id. at 194.
219 See supra note 178 (referencing this interchange). Ellsworth responded, "Against
preambles, we have no animosity." 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 593.
220 Supra note 137 and accompanying text.
221 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 986-87 (pointing out that advocates of both strict
separation and "neutrality" favor the approach of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),
which requires that government actions neither be intended to benefit religion nor have that
principal or primary effect); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas,
J., concurring) ("The First Amendment leaves the Government in a position not of hostility
to religion but of neutrality. The philosophy is that the atheist or agnostic - the nonbeliever
- is entitled to go his own way."); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). For
examples of commentators adopting this view, see LEVY, supra note 2. See, e.g., Douglas
Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 875,902 (1986) ("Curry, Levy, and I agree on the central point: the framers
of the establishment clause had no specific intention to permit nonpreferential aid to religion.
Levy and I agree on the stronger formulation that the Framers intended to forbid such aid.").
222 LEVY, supra note 2, at 75-76.
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Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maryland, South Carolina, and
Georgia.223
" In each of those states the population was so universally affiliated with
sects within the established group (Christian or Protestant) that as a
practical matter those establishments amounted to "nonpreferential" aid to
all religion (i.e., all relevant sects).224
" Therefore, by abolishing such "establishments," the First Amendment
abolished all systems that favor religion over irreligion.225
However, a close reading of Professor Levy's book - even without reference
to other sources - induces one to question his argument. For example, at several
points he undercuts his first premise by honestly acknowledging that many educated
people (he cites some distinguished lawyers) didnot think systems of non-exclusive
subsidy were "establishments., 226 At another point he concedes that the dominant
usage in New England identified "establishment" only with exclusive establish-
ments,227 and elsewhere he tells us that some Virginians thought similarly.228
In support of his second premise - that the population of states with
nonpreferential "establishments" was such that those "establishments" amounted
to subsidies of all religion - Levy writes:
In general, where Protestantism was established, it was synony-
mous with religion, because there were no Jews and Roman
Catholics or too few of them to make a difference; and where
Christianity was established, as in Maryland, which had many
Catholics, Jews were scarcely known. Where Jewish congrega-
tions existed, as in Savannah and Charleston, state law reflected
obliviousness to their presence rather than deliberate discrimina-
tion, and no evidence exists to show that Jews were actually
taxed to support Christianity.229
223 Id. at 42-78.
224 id.
225 Id. at 75-77.
226 Id. at 43, 47; see also id. at 88 (citing Rep. Francis Cummins as defining an establish-
ment as "the state[] giving preference to any religious denomination").
227 Id. at 47-48. For an example of this usage in New England, see JONATHAN MAYHEW,
A DEFENCE OF THE OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHARTER AND CONDUCT OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE
PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL IN FOREIGN PARTS 64 (Boston 1763) (referring to the prevail-
ing "establishment of religion" as the Church of England).
228 Id. at 107 (noting that, in Virginia, opponents of ratifying the Bill of Rights interpreted
the Establishment Clause as banning only a national religion).
229 Id. at 76.
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Professor Levy does not clarify, however, what he means by "too few of [Jews
or Catholics] to make a difference. '"230 He acknowledges that Jews were a presence
in both Savannah, Georgia and Charleston, South Carolina;23' indeed, the Jewish
presence in Savannah was significant.232 Yet both states had "Christian" establish-
ments,233 so neither state practiced nonpreferentialism. Was the legislature
"oblivious" because Jews were politically powerless? If so, this helps explain why
there was a Christian establishment, but it does not make such an establishment
nonpreferential. Moreover, Professor Levy does not explain why state lawmakers
should be "oblivious" to Jewish congregations. Even if they were, were they
similarly oblivious of other non-Christians? Perhaps the American Indians who had
mixed with the state population but retained native beliefs could be mentally
marginalized - but what of the more verbal adherents of deism? In sum, it is
unlikely the First Amendment's ban on a national "establishment" was a ban on
nonpreferentialism. On the contrary, when people referred to an "establishment of
religion," they generally referred either to a single state church or to some other
mechanism whereby one denomination or group of denominations was favored over
others."'
230 id.
231 Id.
232 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1424.
233 See id. (discussing Georgia); id. at 1425 (discussing South Carolina).
234 One could cite dozens of works in support of the foregoing, but I will content myself
with three from England and three from America:
ENGLAND: see, e.g., AN APPEAL TO THE GOOD SENSE OF THE INHABITANTS OF GREAT
BRITAIN CONCERNING THEIR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES 78-79 (London 1770)
(contrasting the large attendance at services of other churches, particularly the Methodist,
with the poor attendance at Church of England services, and referring to the latter as an
"establishment of religion"); P. BARCLAY, A PERSUASIVE TO THE PEOPLE OF SCOTLAND IN
ORDER TO REMOVE THEIR PREJUDICE TO THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 63-64 (London
1713) (advocating "an Establishment of Religion" to promote some religious doctrines and
discourage others); JOHN CHATER, ANOTHER HIGH ROAD TO HELL: AN ESSAY ON THE
PERNICIOUS NATURE AND DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF THE MODERN ENTERTAINMENTS A-A2
(London 1767).
AMERICA: see, e.g., MOSES DICKINSON, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 31-32 (New-London, Connecticut 1755)
(contending that while all religions should be tolerated, the Christian religion ought to be
established and supported by the government "and not be put upon a Level with mere
Heathenism"); EBENEZER GAY, NATURAL RELIGION, AS DISTINGUISH'D FROM REVEALED: A
SERMON PREACHED AT THE ANNUAL DUDLEIAN-LECTURE AT HARVARD-COLLEGE IN
CAMBRIDGE 32 (Boston 1759) (supporting an establishment of religion "free from impure
Mixtures of Heathenish and Popish Errors and Superstitions"); MAYHEw, supra note 227.
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B. Evidence that the Establishment Clause Protected All Theists
On the opposite end of the spectrum from those who claim the Establishment
Clause forbade preference for religion over non-religion are those who argue that it
did no more than interdict a "national church" and protect state religious establish-
ments.235 According to this narrow interpretation of the Clause, official favors to a
broad religious grouping, such as Christianity or Protestantism, do not violate the ban
on establishments.
There is more historical evidence to support this narrow interpretation of the
Establishment Clause than to support the view that the Clause prohibits all
assistance to religion. The most common system of "establishment" in the
eighteenth century was a state church such as the Church of England.236 Some
participants in the ratification process spoke about establishments in this sense,
usually expressing it as state preference for one "sect, 237 "society, ' 238 or
"church. ' 239 Madison called this an "exclusive[] establish[ment]" and spoke against
235 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,678 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,309-10 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); cf. ANTIEAU,
supra note 2, at 140-42 (expressing federalism or states' rights as possibly "one reason" for
the Establishment Clause). For a modem defense of this purely "federalism" view, see SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 2, at 17-43; see also DREISBACH, supra note 2, at 60
(supporting the federalism view, but overlooking federal implied powers by inaccurately
stating that all matters not "explicitly" entrusted to the federal government were reserved to
the states or people).
236 See, e.g., AN APPEAL, supra note 234; CHATER, supra note 234; MAYHEW, supra note
227. See also infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
237 See, e.g., Z, BOSTON INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 359 ("If the rights of conscience, for instance, are not sacredly
reserved to the people, what security will there be, in case the government should have in
their heads a predilection for any one sect in religion?") (emphasis in original); see also 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 202 (remarks of Oliver Wolcott) (speaking from a
federalist perspective at the Connecticut ratifying convention); 4 ELLIOTr's DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 208 (remarks of Richard Spaight) (speaking at the North Carolina ratifying
convention); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 204 (remarks of Edmund Randolph)
(speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention).
238 See infra note 241.
239 An Old Whig, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 13 DocuMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 540-41 (offering an antifederalist perspective).
I hope and trust that there are few persons at present hardy enough to
entertain thoughts of creating any religious establishment for this
country; although I have lately read a piece in the newspaper, which
speaks of religious as well as civil and military offices, as being
hereafter to be disposed of by the new government; but if a majority of
the continental legislature should at any time think fit to establish a
form of religion, for the good people of this continent, with all the
pains and penalties which in other countries are annexed to the
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it at the Virginia ratifying convention.2 4° Moreover, both New York and Rhode
Island proposed amendments to prevent federal preference for any "religious sect
or society."24'
However, "the meaning of the word establishment was not precisely fixed,
2 42
since it could refer to other kinds of government preferences for denomination or
group of denominations over others.2 43 A review of the entire course of ratification
shows that public opinion finally coalesced around the idea of a broader restriction
on federal power than merely protection for state establishments and a ban on a
national church. Shortly after the Constitution became public, Tench Coxe, one of
its most influential advocates, celebrated "catholicism in ecclesiastical affairs" -
that is, nonpreferentialism. 244 Some antifederalists adopted a similar position,
establishment of a national church, what is there in the proposed
constitution to hinder their doing so?
Id. (emphasis in original).
240 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 330.
241 Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), The Avalon
Project at Yale Law School, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ ratri.htm
(last visited Aug. 25, 2005) (stating that "no particular religious sect or society ought to be
favoured, or established by law in preference to others."); Ratification of the Constitution by the
State of New York (July 26, 1788), The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratny.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005) (stating "[t]hat
the People have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to Exercise their
Religion according to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society ought
to be favoured or established by Law in preference of others").
242 Feldman, supra note 2, at 380.
243 See supra note 234 for examples of both uses of the term "establishment of religion."
See also JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 201-02
(London 1771) (referring to a system requiring contribution to the sect of one's choice as an
"establishment of religion," where only Christian sects qualified).
244 See An American Citizen, On the Federal Government, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER,
Sept. 26, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 247.
To take a proper view of the ground on which we stand, it may be
necessary to recollect the manner in which the United States were
originally settled and established. - Want of charity in the religious
systems ofEurope and ofjustice in their political governments were the
principal moving causes, which drove the emigrants of various
countries to the American continent. The Congregationalists, Quakers,
Presbyterians and other British dissenters, the Catholics of England and
Ireland, the Hugonots ofFrance, the German Lutherans, Calvinists, and
Moravians, with several other societies, established themselves in the
different colonies, thereby laying the ground of that catholicism in
ecclesiastical affairs, which has been observable since the late revo-
lution: Religious liberty naturally promotes corresponding dispositions
in matters of government.
Id. at 248.
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praising the virtues of equal treatment for all religions, denominations, and sects -
without any proviso that those religions, denominations, or sects be Protestant or
Christian.245 Similarly, an amendment approved by a committee of the Maryland
convention (but rejected by the whole) would have proscribed not only preference
for a particular "sect or society," but any "national religion.",
21
Leading federalists seem to have adopted nonpreferentialism partly as a natural
consequence of their understanding of the Constitution's oaths - that such oaths
amounted to a necessary and sufficient test of theism. 247 As noted earlier,
nonpreferentialism meshed well with state government practices during the
1776-1789 period, when public assistance to a wide range of religious denomina-
tions was common.248
In any event, people on both sides began to judge the Constitution by the
criterion of whether it furthered equal treatment for all religions. One antifederalist
author wrote critically of the Constitution because it seemed to reflect either of two
extremes, both of which were unacceptable to most people:
From the proceedings of the convention, respecting liberty of
conscience, foreign politicians might be led to draw a strange
conclusion, viz. that the majority of that assembly were either
men of no religion, or all of one religion; such a conclusion
naturally follows their silence on that subject; they must either
have been indifferent about religion, or determined to compel
the whole continent to conform to their own.2 4 9
245 Centinel, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 466; Timothy Meanwell, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETrEER, Oct. 29, 1787,
reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 511; Letter VI, Dec. 25, 1787,
reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 268, 274 ("The following, I
think, will be allowed to be unalienable or fundamental rights in the United States: - No
man, demeaning himself peaceably, shall be molested on account of his religion or mode of
worship[.]"); Petition Against Confirmation of the Ratification of the Constitution, in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 710, 711 ("That the rights of conscience should
be secured to all men, that no man should be molested for his religion, and that none should
be compelled contrary to their principles and inclination to hear or support the clergy of any
one religion.").
246 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 553 ("That there be no national religion
established by law; but that all persons be equally entitled to protection in their religious
liberty.").
247 See supra Part III.
241 Supra Part IV.A. 1.
249 Philadelphiensis, PHILA. FREEMAN'S J., Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 251, 253 (emphasis in original).
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On the federalist side, the "Landholder" and William Williams publicly
exchanged letters25° in which they agreed that the Constitution should recognize
God in a non-denominational way."' Another Connecticut citizen chimed in with
a proposal for a religious test acceptable to almost all theists:
I swear, in the name of the all-seeing DEITY, that I will
henceforth be a slave to no sect or party of men .... I likewise
solemnly declare that I consider myself as a citizen of the
intellectual world and a subject of its Almighty Lawgiver and
Judge. That by Him I am placed upon an honorable theater of
action to sustain, in the sight of mortal and IMMORTAL beings,
that character and part which He shall assign me, in order to my
being trained up for perfection and immortality - and shall,
from this time forth, devote my life to the service of GOD, my
country, and mankind.
So help me GOD!252
I already have quoted at length from James Iredell's speech at the North
Carolina ratifying convention, arguing for equal recognition of the oaths of people
of all religions.253 Apparently, most North Carolina delegates firmly rejected the
bigoted arguments that if the Constitution were adopted, America's doors would
open to "Jews and pagans of every kind to come among us. '254 Rather, North
Carolina's temporary recalcitrance derived from other sources. 25 Indeed, North
Carolina and other states took affirmative steps to implement nonpreferential
theism. For example, North Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island all recommended
exemptions for groups that objected to oaths or military service.25" New
250 Supra note 178 and accompanying text.
251 See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 587-90, 593.
252 A New Test, NEW HAvEN GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 588 (emphasis in original). The piece was titled "A NEW TEST"
and proclaimed that it was "[h]umbly proposed to those who wish for a test in the new
Constitution." Id.
233 See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
254 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 199 (quoting David Caldwell, speaking at the
North Carolina ratifying convention).
255 ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 155-56.
256 Two of the Virginia amendments were as follows:
14th. That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures ... all warrants... without information on oath
(or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of
legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive ....
19th. [A]ny person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be
exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear
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Hampshire,257 Virginia,25 New York,259 North Carolina,26° and Rhode Island26 all
proposed guarantees of free exercise and bans on establishments. South Carolina's
proposal to treat the oath explicitly as a religious test was an additional endorsement
of nonpreferential theism. 262 Not a single convention, not even that of pious
Massachusetts, 263 sought preference for Protestantism or even Christianity.2' This
arms in his stead.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 658-59 (emphasis added).
Similar amendments were adopted elsewhere. See 2 ELUOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2,
at 244 (discussing North Carolina's proposal); Ratification of the Constitution by the State
of Rhode Island, May 29, 1790, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratri.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) ("[A]ny
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, ought to be exempted, upon payment of an
equivalent, to employ another to bear arms in his stead.").
257 Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New Hampshire (June 21, 1788), The
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/
ratnh.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2004) ("Congress shall make no Laws touching Religion, or
to infringe the rights of Conscience.").
258 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 659.
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence; and therefore all men have an equal, natural, and
unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the
dictates of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society
ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others.
Id.
259 Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788), The Avalon
Project at Yale Law School, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratny.htm
(last visited Aug. 29,2005) ("[T]he People have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely
and peaceably to Exercise their Religion according to the dictates of Conscience, and that no
Religious Sect or Society ought to be favoured or established by Law in preference of
others.").
260 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 244 ("That religion, or the duty which we owe
to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men have an equal, natural, and
unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and
that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in
preference to others.").
26, See Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island (May 29, 1790), The
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/
ratri.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
262 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
263 Massachusetts did not offer an amendment on the subject of religion. See 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 177-78.
264 Thus, the Court's suggestion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), that
Christianity was thought to be preferred, is simply inaccurate. Id at 52 & n.36 (citing JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTIJTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874, at 593
(1801)).
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unanimity emerged despite the desires of some antifederalists for a Christian
government and the practical need to secure antifederalist votes for ratification.
This unanimity was remarkable, but ideologically consistent: The anti-
establishment principle flowed from the free exercise principle. By free exercise,
the founders meant protecting God's dominion over the individual conscience, so
long as the individual admitted God's dominion over that conscience - no matter
what one's faith might be. 65
In the aftermath of ratification, apologists for the Constitution trumpeted the
inclusive theism of the new regime. In July 1788, Tench Coxe addressed the
skeptical folk of Western Pennsylvania:
I want those good people to read the constitution quietly by
themselves, and to judge like reasonable and free men for
themselves.... They will see that every man among them,
whether [P]rotestant or [C]atholic, rich or poor, may elect or be
elected. The Assembly may chuse [sic] any of them a Senator,
or the people may chuse any of them a foederal [sic] Represen-
tative, or any of them may be chosen Vice-President or Presi-
dent of the United States. Nothing in the constitution forbids it,
though they must be sensible that a man must be very good and
very wise, to deserve and receive such great trusts from the
Assembly and from the people .... In other countries religious
tests would prevent him, though he were ever so wise, ever so
good, or ever so much beloved and esteemed.... But our new
foederal [sic] constitution admits all, whether [P]rotestant, or
[C]atholic, or [P]resbyterian, or [E]piscopalian, &c. for it
expressly says there shall be no religious test.... The foederal
[sic] connexion, established on these liberal and generous
principles.., which it has pleased God to raise up in the world.
... They will not render to each other nor to the government,
tithes, nor tenths, nor free gifts (as they have been preposter-
ously termed) nor any species of taxes, as religious men or
societies. Nothing will be expected, nothing will be required
but peace and good will, and brotherly loving kindness. This
excellent quality of the new government will warm and expand
our bosoms whenever we reflect upon it. The liberality and
virtue of America is establishing perfect equality and freedom
among all religious denominations and societies, and will no
doubt produce to us a great reward .... There alone can the
sincere votaries of religion enjoy their lives, their civil and
265 Supra Part II.D.
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religious rights and property, without suffering from their
attachment to that church in which they have been born and
bred, and which they believe to be right and true.266
Coxe published those words the same month James Iredell presented his speech
at the North Carolina ratifying convention wherein Iredell stirringly affirmed
respect for oaths sworn by Jews, Hindus, and other non-Christians.267 The follow-
ing month, the noted clergyman Manasseh Cutler further proclaimed the new
national doctrine of inclusive theism:
By the Constitution now established in the United States,
religious as well as civil liberty is secured. Full toleration is
granted for free inquiry, and the exercise of the rights of
conscience. No one kind of religion, or sect of religion, is
established as the national religion, nor made, by national laws,
the test of truth. Some serious Christians may possibly tremble
for the Ark, and think the Christian religion in danger when
divested of the patronage of civil power. They may fear inroads
from licentiousness and infidelity, on the one hand, and from
sectaries and party divisions on the other. But we may dismiss
our fears, when we consider that truth can never be in real
hazard, where there is a sufficiency of light and knowledge, and
full liberty to vindicate it .... 268
Iredell had explicitly included Jews and Hindus in the new order.269 Coxe had
explicitly included Catholics and Protestants and proclaimed "perfect equality and
freedom among all religious denominations and societies. '' 7 Cutler affirmed that
no sect nor any one kind of religion would be preferred - apparently not even
Christianity. 27'
That such were the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement was reflected in the
response from America's largest single non-Christian minority - the Jews. On
September 7, 1787, Jonas Phillips, a prominent Philadelphia Jew, 272 had petitioned
266 A Friend of Society and Liberty, To the INHABITANTS of the Western Counties of
Pennsylvania, PENN. GAZETTE, Jul. 23, 1788, reprinted in 18 DOCuMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 281-82 (emphasis in original).
267 See supra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
26 Manasseh Cutler, Sermon at Marietta, Northwest Territory, Aug. 24, 1788, in 18
DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY, supra note 2, at 342.
269 2 ELLOTT's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 193-98.
270 See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
271 See supra note 268.
272 He was a founding member of Philadelphia's Mickvd Israel Congregation. See Jewish
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the federal convention to adjust any oath for participating in public life so it could
be taken by people of his faith.273 Once the Constitution was ratified, Jews were
very much among the celebrants. Just as importantly, they were welcomed as such.
On August 2, 1788, the Comte de Moustier wrote to the Comte de Montmorin from
New York:
The city of Newyork [sic] did not even wait for the State
Convention to give its decision. It had its procession at a time
when it was strongly doubted that the State would adopt the
Constitution .... I had been invited [to a celebration dinner],
and I attended .... To the left of Congress were its Officers and
the members of the Clergy from the City, Anglicans,
Presbyterians, Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Jews, all
indiscriminately seated, except that the Anglican Bishop had
taken the right from all the others and had said the blessing.27 a
Philadelphia eclipsed even this show of unity. Its parade of celebration was
quite a spectacular affair. We have a lengthy eye-witness account by Dr. Benjamin
Rush, reading in part:
The Clergy formed a very agreeable part of the Procession -
They manifested, by their attendance, their sense of the connec-
tion between religion and good government. They amounted to
seventeen in number. Four and five of them marched arm in
arm with each other, to exemplify the Union. Pains were taken
to connect Ministers of the most dissimilar religious principles
together, thereby to shew [sic] the influence of a free govern-
ment in promoting christian charity. The Rabbi of the Jews,
locked in the arms of two ministers of the gospel, was a most
delightful sight. There could not have been a more happy
emblem contrived, of that section of the new constitution, which
opens all its power and offices alike, not only to every sect of
christians, but to worthy men of every religion.275
History in Philadelphia, available at http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish-historyin.
Philadephia (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
273 The text of the letter appears at 3 FARRAND, supra note 2, at 78-80.
274 Letter from Comte de Moustier to Comte de Montmorin (Aug. 2, 1788), in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 308-09 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
275 Benjamin Rush, Observations on the Fourth ofJuly Procession in Philadelphia, PENN.
MERCURY, July 15, 1788, reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 265
(footnote omitted) (first emphasis added).
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V. CONGRESSIONAL ADOPTION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
When framed by the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement, the pieces of the
congressional process snap easily into place. In essence, that process was one of
shaping the First Amendment to fit the adopters' understanding of the Gentlemen's
Agreement.276
In Part I.B, I discussed in a general way the First Congress's adoption of the
Bill of Rights. In this Part, I focus more specifically on the debate over the
Establishment Clause.
On June 8, 1789, Madison rose in the House of Representatives to introduce his
amendments. After some discussion he detailed each of these. There were three
pertaining to religion. One was that "[n]o state shall violate the equal rights of
conscience. ,277 Another was that "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms
shall be compelled to render military service in person.""27  The former was
Madison's own idea.279 The latter had been endorsed by the conventions of only
two states 20 (although Rhode Island was later to make it three). 28 ' Neither
amendment survived Congress.
Madison's remaining proposal, however, was a genuine effort to embody the
"religion terms" of the public bargain. It read as follows:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of reli-
gious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.2 2
276 ANTIEAU, supra note 2, at 208 ("Moreover, the task of the First Congress was not to
write into law the personal views of its members; rather it was to assimilate the proposals
submitted by the states together with what was thought to be politically satisfactory and in
the best interests of both religion and government.").
277 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 452.
278 Id. at451.
279 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
280 See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 659 (reporting one of Virginia's proposed
amendments as providing "[t]hat any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to
be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead");
4 ELLIOTr's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 244 (reporting an identical proposal from North
Carolina).
281 Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Rhode Island, May 29, 1790, The
Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/
ratri.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) ("[A]ny person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms,
ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent, to employ another to bear arms in his
stead.").
282 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 451.
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The phrase that eventually became the foundation of the Establishment Clause was,
of course, "nor shall any national religion be established." '283 As befits the Clause's
role in furthering free exercise, this language was embedded between two free
exercise provisions. It was wider than a prohibition, as existed in some state
constitutions, of preference for any particular "sect or society. 2 4 Rather, it was
similar to the amendment proposed by the convention minority in Maryland285 in
that it proscribed a national "religion." Thus, Madison's language also would have
banned preference for Protestantism or for Christianity in general.
Over two months passed before the House of Representatives discussed this
proposal once again. On August 15, Madison explained that his proposed wording
meant that "Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary
to their conscience."'2 86 Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland urged adoption
of the amendment because "[h]e thought it would tend more towards conciliating
the minds of the people to the Government than almost any other amendment he had
heard proposed."28 7
Significantly, Madison did not claim that this language represented his own
views. When Connecticut's Roger Sherman expressed skepticism about the need
for the amendment,288 Madison, like Representative Carroll, offered public
sentiment as the justification:
Whether the words are necessary or not, he did not mean to say,
but they had been required by some of the State Conventions,
who seemed to entertain an opinion that [the Necessary and
Proper Clause] ... enabled [Congress] to make laws of such a
nature as might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish
a national religion.289
283 Id.
284 See supra note 241.
285 See supra note 94.
286 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 758.
287 Id. at 730.
288 Id.
289 Id. That he did not claim that the language reflected his own thoughts renders
unnecessary Professor Hamburger's speculation that Madison had changed his mind from the
time of the Remonstrance, in which he had argued "that Religion is wholly exempt from its
[Civil Society's] cognizance." HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 106 (discussing James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), available at http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/remon.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2005)). Given the context of the Remonstrance, however, and the
understanding of the time, it is unlikely that Madison meant the words, "Religion is wholly
exempt from its cognizance," in quite the way we would understand them. See supra notes
134-37 and accompanying text (quoting Oliver Ellsworth's views that government should
not meddle in religion, but supporting legal sanctions against blasphemy and atheism).
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Other members of Congress had their own ideas of the precise language needed
to comply with the Gentlemen's Agreement, and they sought to shape the proposed
amendment to comply with their understanding of the bargain. For example, the
Gentlemen's Agreement contemplated no constitutional protection for atheism.
290
Accordingly, Peter Sylvester of New York wanted reassurance that the amendment
would not "have a tendency to abolish religion altogether,' 291' and Benjamin
Huntington of Connecticut "hoped... the amendment would be made in such a way
as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but
not to patronise [sic] those who professed no religion at all. 292 This could explain,
of course, why the same houses of Congress that adopted the Establishment Clause
saw no inconsistency in hiring chaplains to offer prayers293 or in resolving to reserve
a "day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging, with
grateful hearts, the many signal favors of Almighty God.
294
Under the Gentlemen's Agreement the term "establishment" had a broader
meaning than merely a government church. 295 Accordingly, Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts thought the passage "would read better if it was, that no religious
doctrine shall be established by law. 2 96 Huntington asked for assurance that the
amendment would not interfere with the multiple establishments in New England2 97
- one of the few suggestions that a goal of the amendment was to protect state
establishments.298
Still, Madison's language was too narrow to satisfy the terms of the Gentle-
men's Agreement because even if the amendment banned a "national religion," the
federal government might favor a group of religions - such as Christianity and
Judaism (or Protestantism and Catholicism) - over others. Thus, Samuel
Livermore of New Hampshire suggested that the clause be re-written to read "that
290 Supra Parts II.D & III.
291 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 729.
292 Id. at 730-31. See also Feldman, supra note 2, at 410.
293 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 858 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,794 (1983) (sustaining
use of legislative chaplains to open the day with prayer).
294 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 914.
295 See supra Part IV.B.
296 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 730.
297 Id.
298 For another, see PETERSBURG VA. GAZETTE, July, 26, 1787, reprinted in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 178-79 ("Let Congress be invested with an
independent power over the states, without violating the religious tenets or customs of any
perticular [sic] state."). Nevertheless, Professor Howe was probably correct to conclude that
this was not a major motivation for the Establishment Clause. HowE, supra note 2, at 22-23;
see also Feldman, supra note 2, at 408 (concluding that this was not a major motivation for
the Establishment Clause because no one thought federal government had power to interfere
with state establishments anyway).
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Congress shall make no laws touching religion," '299 and the House initially passed
this version." But this was too broad for the Gentlemen's Agreement because it
would have prevented Congress from using its express and implied powers to foster
all religions equally.
The Senate responded with a proposal stating, "Congress shall make no law
establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship."' ' The House rejected it in
favor of Fisher Ames's version: "Congress shall make no law establishing
religion,"3 2 which made it clear that multiple establishments were interdicted,
whether of sects or of religions. The final language, of course, has a similar effect.
Meanwhile, Congress removed all reference to "rights of conscience" from the
amendment, thereby eliminating any suggestion that it protected atheistic or non-
religious claims. 33
Finally, insertion of the phrase, "Congress shall make no law" apparently
reflected a decision not to accommodate the fear that the President and Senate might
use the treaty power to interfere with matters of faith. That fear, however, had not
been widely expressed.3"
CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause was not crafted to reflect the notions of Jefferson or
Madison or any other small collection of individuals - not even the individuals
who happened to sit in the First Congress. The Establishment Clause was designed
to fulfill part of the public bargain - the Gentlemen's Agreement - pursuant to
which the Constitution was ratified. Thus, reconstructing the "religion terms" of
the public bargain enables us to illuminate the meaning of the Clause to a far greater
degree than previously thought possible.0 5 Based on the terms of the Gentlemen's
Agreement, the following conclusions seem fairly certain:
299 ANNALS, supra note 2, at 731.
3 LEVY, supra note 2, at 101.
301 Id. at 102.
" Id. at 101; ANNALS, supra note 2, at 766.
303 Whether "rights of conscience" was dropped to eliminate redundancy or to limit First
Amendment to religion, the effect is the same: "the fiamers deliberately confined the clause
to religious claims." McConnell, supra note 2, at 1496.
Incongruously, while conceding that the original meaning of the religion clauses would
deny atheists religious exemptions, McConnell claims without support that "to subject an
atheist to civil disabilities would be a violation of free exercise." Id. at 1500. I rather think
it would be a violation of equal protection instead.
" I have found three instances. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
305 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1141-43 (discussing perceived historical
uncertainties about the meaning of the religion clauses) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-60 (2d ed. 1988) for supposedly different views
about religion among the framers); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 2, at 1411 (claiming
"there is no clear history" on the religion clauses).
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" Before adoption of the First Amendment, Congress had no express power
over religion. The First Amendment did not change that.
306
" Nevertheless, as many participants in the debate recognized, Congress
could exercise implied powers over religion through the incidental powers
doctrine recognized in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
30 7
• Thus, Congress had plenary control over religion in the District of
Columbia, in all other federal enclaves, and wide control of it in the
territories. Congress could impose excise taxes on church sales, define the
content of religion in the armed forces and in the militia, grant or deny
religious exemptions from military service, regulate the interstate com-
merce of religious sects, and promote some or all faiths in dealings with the
Indians. Moreover, the federal government could impact religion by
treaty.
30 8
* The formal role of the Establishment Clause in the Constitution was as an
exception to the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Establishment Clause
qualified the Necessary and Proper Clause by interdicting certain means of
executing enumerated powers even if those means were otherwise
necessary and proper. It is apparent, however, that the Establishment
Clause did not eliminate entirely federal power over religion.30 9
31 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 103-21 and accompanying text. In the Necessary and Proper Clause,
the word "necessary" meant absolutely or reasonably necessary or in a customary and
convenient manner for executing an enumerated power. "Proper" meant in accordance with
fiduciary norms. See Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note 2, at 261-65. However,
Congress could not resort to its enumerated powers merely as a "pretext" to govern religion
in the states. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 357-59 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.).
Nor does the rule of interpretation we contend for, sanction any
usurpation, on the part of the national government; since, if the
argument be, that the implied powers of the constitution may be
assumed and exercised, for purposes not really connected with the
powers specifically granted, under color of some imaginary relation
between them, the answer is, that this is nothing more than arguing
from the abuse of constitutional powers ... ; that the danger of the
abuse will be checked by the judicial department, which, by comparing,
the means with the proposed end, will decide, whether the connection
is real, or assumed as the pretext for the usurpation of powers not
belonging to the government.
Id. at 357.
308 See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
31 Cf notes 297-98 and accompanying text. My conclusion thus conflicts somewhat with
that of Professor Kurt Lash, who argues that the contemporaneous meaning of the Clause is
one of"no federal power" over religion - although he concedes some exceptions. See Lash,
supra note 2, at 1096-99. The "no federal power" view has encouraged some to search for
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
• The Establishment Clause was designed to buttress free exercise by
requiring the federal government, to the extent its legislation touched
religion, to treat all faiths in a non-discriminatory manner. This require-
ment obviously went beyond a mere ban on a national church. Rather the
Establishment Clause was an extension of the trust duty of impartiality that
already pervaded the Constitution.10
• The impartiality of the Establishment Clause was not perfect. Like the Free
Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause was seen as irrelevant to the
irreligious. Both provisions protected only theists. Those who did not
believe in God did not have a "religion" within the meaning of the First
Amendment and had no standing under that Amendment.31' In other words,
under the original meaning, Michael Newdow 12 is out of court.
• The Clause said that "Congress shall make no law. '313 It did not address
federal interference with religion through mechanisms other than congres-
sional lawmaking, such as the treaty power.314
• As everyone concedes, the Clause did not apply to the states. 315
Even the most thorough original meaning analysis cannot solve all problems.
For example, original meaning analysis is not conclusive on the question of whether
the "theism" protected by the Clause is limited to belief in a God who rewards
moral conduct and punishes immoral conduct.31 6 Many of the ratifiers spoke in
terms of such a God, but others acknowledged that deists - believers in a more
impersonal divinity - should be protected as well.317
Establishment Clause meaning in the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Richard Albert,
Beyond the Conventional Establishment Clause Narrative, SEATTLE U. L. REv. 329 (2005).
I think it is important, however, to get the meaning of the First Amendment correct before
we move to the Fourteenth!
310 See Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 2, at 1136-68.
311 Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1146 (summarizing Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970), which held that belief in God was not a necessary part of a "religion" for
selective service purposes).
312 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
313 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
314 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
311 See Kurland, supra note 2, at 843 (stating that the evidence "overwhelmingly supports"
this conclusion); HowE, supra note 2, at 1-32 (arguing that the First Amendment was
targeted at federal establishments, not state establishments).
316 This was seen by many as the "teeth" in an oath. See supra notes 158-59 and
accompanying text. As comments such as those of Theophilus Parsons show, however, it
probably was not absolutely necessary to a contemporaneous definition ofreligion. See supra
note 152 and accompanying text.
311 See, e.g., supra note 152 and accompanying text (reporting the remarks of Theophilus
Parsons at the Massachusetts ratifying convention).
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Professor Robert Cord, whose own study of the Establishment Clause led him to
conclusions similar to my own, poses a problem of application. America today is a
more religiously diverse country than in the late eighteenth century,318 so equal
treatment of all faiths presents more challenges, A law subsidizing religion in the
District of Columbia and defining it to include Christianity and Judaism but to exclude
Islam, might have been constitutional in 1820 when there were no Muslims present to
be disadvantaged. Today, however, our population includes a significant number of
Muslims.319 Moreover, a prayer enacted for District of Columbia public schools that
invoked "Almighty God," as did the New York State Regents prayer in Engel v.
Vitale,320 would violate the original meaning of the Establishment Clause today - not
because it offended atheists or agnostics, 32 1 but because some people worship a God
who is extremely powerful, but not, technically speaking, "almighty."
322
The conclusion that the religion clauses protect only theists does not, of course,
eliminate other constitutional protections for atheists and agnostics. They can
appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause 323 for protection
318 See CORD, supra note 2, at 165; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 1142-43.
319 The number of Muslims in the United States is not known with any degree of
exactitude, and estimates vary widely. See THE ISLAM PROJECT, http://www.theislamproject.
org/education/UnitedStates.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2005) (reporting reputable estimates
for the year 2000 as 1,104,000 and 4,132,000).
320 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The prayer, which I regularly said as an elementary school child
in New York State, was "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
321 Cf id. at 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment leaves the
Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality. The philosophy is that
the atheist or agnostic - the nonbeliever - is entitled to go his own way."). This view
would seem to vary, at least in emphasis, from Justice Douglas's pronouncement when
writing for the court ten years earlier in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952):
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.... We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that
shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with
religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects
the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service
to their spiritual needs.
Id. at 313-14. See also HOWE, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing the differences between
Douglas's views in the two cases). The conclusion of this Article suggests that Douglas's
earlier opinion was more constitutionally accurate.
322 For example, some Jews, such as Rabbi Harold S. Kushner, resolve the "all good/all
powerful" dilemma by concluding that God is not all powerful. See HAROLD S. KUSHNER,
WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD PEOPLE 129 (1981) (arguing that some things are "too
hard even for God").
323 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
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against state discrimination and to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause324
for protection against federal discrimination. Exactly how much protection these
provisions offer, however, is an unanswered question.
So there are issues that original meaning analysis does not resolve. Yet it does
resolve difficulties and inconsistencies that have bedeviled courts and commentators
for years. Perhaps, after all, it is better to devote our energy to solving real
constitutional problems than to be trapped in snares created only by our own
misunderstanding.
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
324 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause reads, "No person shall.... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See, e.g.,
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). My conclusion is that equal protection principles are
part of the Necessary and Proper Clause, not the Due Process Clause. See Natelson, Public
Trust, supra note 2, at 1171-74. See generally Natelson, Necessary and Proper, supra note
2, at 243-322.
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